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ABSTRACT 
In this article, we discuss what we consider to be the ten important 
and influential biotechnology patent law judicial decisions of 2018.  These 
hinged on a variety of patent doctrines.  An abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA) for the multiple sclerosis drug Ampyra set the stage 
for the Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 
2018) decision, in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(Federal Circuit) provided guidance on how to conduct an obviousness 
analysis (35 U.S.C. §103).  The Berkheimer v. HP Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
decision, although addressing a software invention, provided valuable 
insight into how to determine if inventions fall within patent-eligible 
subject matter (35 U.S.C. §101).  Widely-anticipated by the branded and 
generic pharmaceutical industries, sovereign Native American nations, 
and consumers alike, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) decision held that tribal sovereign 
immunity could not be used to shield patents covering the drug Restasis 
in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB).  In Regents of the University of California v. 
Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018), the Federal Circuit found there to 
be no interference-in-fact between patents and patent applications 
covering CRISPR gene editing owned by the Broad Institute and the 
University of California.  The United States Supreme Court (Supreme 
Court), in Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC (2018), held that IPR proceedings violate neither Article III nor the 
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and, in SAS 
Institute Inc. v. Iancu (2018), further elaborated the law of IPRs by 
requiring the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to 
produce a final written decision (FWD) on all claims challenged by a 
petitioner in an IPR petition.  How to apply the written description 
requirement (35 U.S.C. §112) to patent claims covering monoclonal 
antibodies, as well as the requirements for granting a permanent 
injunction against infringing medicines or other therapeutic agents, were 
both the subject of the decision in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
The Supreme Court gave its first interpretation of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) for the approval of biosimilar 
drugs in Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. (2017), addressing, among other 
things, the disclosure and information exchange provisions of the statute, 
commonly known as the “patent dance” over Sandoz’ biosimilar of 
Amgen’s biologic, Neupogen. In contrast to cases where the Supreme 
Court deigned to act, the Court decided not to act in Regeneron 
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Pharmaceuticals v. Merus (2018), denying a petition for certiorari to 
consider the law of inequitable conduct.  In a decision of considerable 
importance, the Supreme Court considered, in Life Techs. Corp. v. 
Promega Corp. (2017), whether the supply of a single component, Taq 
polymerase, of a multi-component toolkit for genetic testing by DNA 
amplification, for combination abroad, violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), 
reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision that it does, and remanding the 
case for further proceedings.  Biotechnology patent law evolved in 2018 
across a number of frontiers, and will certainly continue its doctrinal 
evolution in 2019.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2018 was a busy and exciting one for biotechnology patent 
law. The ownership odyssey of patents claiming mammalian 
CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing—perhaps the most important biotechnology 
innovation since the polymerase chain reaction (PCR)—was finally tested 
in Federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal 
Circuit) turned a distinctly cold shoulder to the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe’s invocation of tribal sovereign immunity to prevent inter partes 
review (IPR) of its drug patents. And the United States Supreme Court 
(Supreme Court) offered its views on the constitutional legitimacy of 
IPRs. In this article, we present a top ten list of the most important 2018 
developments in biotechnology patent law. These top ten decisions offer 
insights about both the current and future state of biotechnology patent 
law.1 
Admittedly, choosing the top ten judicial decisions suffers from an 
inevitable degree of subjectivity. However, we believe these decisions are 
among the most important decisions of the year in biotechnology patent 
law even if others might prefer to substitute a case or two for those on our 
list. Eight of the top ten decisions discussed in this article were delivered 
during the 2018 calendar year. Two constitute temporal anomalies, having 
been decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 but are included because of 
their great importance to biotechnology patent law. 
 We discuss the top ten biotechnology patent decisions below. 
These decisions are not presented in any particular order. After 
consideration of individual judicial decisions, we conclude by suggesting 
1. Much of the discussion of biotechnology law cases in this article is adapted, with full
permission, from case summaries written by Dr. Kevin E. Noonan on his leading biotechnology patent 
law blog, www.PatentDocs.org. 
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what prospective impact these decisions may have on biotechnology 
patent law. 
II. THE 2018 TOP TEN IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW
A. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges Newman, Dyk, and Taranto; opinion 
by Judge Taranto; dissenting opinion by Judge Newman). 
Determining obviousness is always a reconstruction, imperfectly 
done, of a past that never was. The prior art is consulted and the question 
asked: Would a worker of ordinary skill in the art have been able to 
achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success? 
Of course, this question is posed against a backdrop of the ordinarily 
skilled worker not having achieved the invention; that accomplishment 
was attained by the actual inventor(s). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, 
since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,2 and the Patent Act, since 1952,3 have 
recognized that sometimes the answer to the question must be no, if only 
to ensure satisfaction of the constitutional mandate that Congress only 
grant patents that will “promote the progress of . . . [the] useful arts.”4 
In patent litigation, defendants have ample motivation to cast the 
imperfect past in a light most favorable to the claimed invention being 
obvious. To balance the rhetorical scales, defendants also bear the burden 
of establishing obviousness (as in all invalidity pleadings) by clear and 
convincing evidence. But what is clear and convincing to some is not to 
others, and the Federal Circuit’s split decision affirming the district 
court’s obviousness determination in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane 
Labs., Inc. illustrates that point, while at the same time showing that even 
the objective indicia of nonobviousness identified by the Supreme Court 
in Graham v. John Deere5 do not always provide a reliable, fact- and 
historically based shield against a finding of obviousness.6 
2. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851). 
3. 35 U.S.C. §103 (2017) (“[A] claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that 
the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between 
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have 
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in 
which the invention was made.”). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
6. See generally Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2018). 
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The lawsuit arose when Roxane Laboratories and co-defendants 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. each 
filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for Acorda’s 
multiple sclerosis drug Ampyra and sent Paragraph IV letters to Acorda 
(and co-plaintiff Alkermes Pharma Ireland Ltd.) asserting that four 
Orange Book-listed patents (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,007,826; 8,663,685; 
8,354,437; and 8,440,703) were invalid.7 As the Federal Circuit panel 
stated, there was one additional patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,540,938, owned 
by Elan Corp. Plc and exclusively licensed to Acorda.8 That patent 
broadly claimed therapeutic formulations of 4-aminopyridine (4-AP), 
while Acorda’s patents were for narrower formulations having specific 
characteristics and properties that distinguished (undisputedly, for novelty 
purposes) these claims from the claims of the ‘938 patent.9 
For the purposes of the appeal, all the asserted claims recited 
methods, dosing regimens, and sustained-release formulations for 
methods of administering to a patient with multiple sclerosis a sustained-
release 4-AP formulation “(1) in a 10 mg dose twice a day (2) at that stable 
dose for the entire treatment period of at least two weeks (3) to achieve 4-
AP serum levels of 15–35 ng/ml and (4) to improve walking.”10 The 
parties treated the following claims as representative:  
Asserted claim seven (dependent from claim six) of the ‘826 patent: 
6. A dosing regimen method for providing a 4-aminopyridine at a
therapeutically effective concentration in order to improve walking in a 
human with multiple sclerosis in need thereof, said method comprising: 
         initiating administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally 
administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10 
milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily for a day without a prior 
period of 4-aminopyridine titration, and then, 
         maintaining administration of 4-aminopyridine by orally 
administering to said human a sustained release composition of 10 
milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily; without a subsequent period 
of 4-aminopyridine titration, 
         whereby an in vivo CmaxSS:CminSS ratio of 1.0 to 3.5 and a CavSS of 
15 ng/ml to 35 ng/ml are maintained in the human. 
7. Id. at 1313. 
8. Id.
9. Id. 
10. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1313. 
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7. The method of claim 6, whereby an increase in walking speed is
obtained in said human.11 
Asserted claim twenty-two of the ‘437 patent (dependent from claim 
eighteen, which depends on claim one):  
A method of increasing walking speed in a human multiple sclerosis 
patient in need thereof comprising orally administering to said 
patient a sustained release composition of 10 milligrams of 4-
aminopyridine twice daily for a time period of at least two weeks, 
wherein said 10 milligrams of 4-aminopyridine twice daily are the 
only doses of 4-aminopyridine administered to said patient during 
said time period. 
. . . 
18. The method of claim 1[,] wherein said sustained release
composition is a tablet. 
. . . 
22. The method of claim 18[,] wherein said tablet exhibits a release
profile to obtain a CavSS of about 15 ng/ml to about 35 ng/ml.12 
In the ensuing ANDA litigation,, the defendants stipulated to their 
infringement, but counterclaimed that all claims at issue were invalid for 
obviousness.13 The district court found the ‘826, ‘685, ‘437, and ‘703 
patents (but not the ‘938 patent) obvious and entered final judgment and 
an injunction that precluded final approval by the FDA of defendants’ 
ANDAs until July 20, 2018 (the expiration date of the ‘938 patent).14 This 
appeal ensued. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Taranto joined 
by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman dissented vigorously.15 The opinion set 
forth the extensive prior art asserted against Acorda’s claims, evidence 
that Elan had tried (and failed) to produce a suitable 4-AP formulation, 
and evidence that Sanofi had also attempted making such a formulation 
without success.16 Distinctions from the prior art included the need to 
titrate the dose of 4-AP, which (as the opinion concedes) had a “narrow 
11. U.S. Patent No. 8,007,826 col. 27 ll. 41–59 (filed Dec. 13, 2004). 
12. U.S. Patent No. 8,354,437 col. 28 ll. 55–57 (filed Apr. 8, 2005). 
13. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 14-882-LPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48479, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2017), aff’d, 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
14. Id. at *199. The district court found the ‘938 patent not invalid and infringed, judgments
not appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
15. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d 1310.
16. Id. 
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toxic-to-therapeutic range.”17 Also, the opinion noted variable reports of 
4-AP efficacy and frequent reports of serious side effects (including 
seizures) from 4-AP administration in the prior art, and that Acorda’s 
methods, administration regimens, and sustained-release formulations 
were the only ones the FDA approved to improve walking speed in 
multiple sclerosis patients.18 
Nevertheless, the majority affirmed based on finding the salient 
limitations (set forth above and numbered (1) through (4)) recited in the 
prior art, and that the skilled worker would have had a reasonable 
expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention in view of this 
extensive art.19 The majority rejected Acorda’s three contentions: “that 
the district court erred in finding that a person of skill would have had a 
motivation to combine the prior art to arrive at the Acorda invention and 
a reasonable expectation of success in doing so”; “that the claim 
limitations relating to pharmacokinetics—i.e., achieving 4-AP serum 
levels of 15–35 ng/ml— are inherent in the claimed invention and 
therefore obvious”; and “that the court improperly applied a categorical 
rule that a blocking patent (the Elan patent) negates any findings in favor 
of Acorda on the objective indicia of commercial success, failure of 
others, and long felt but unmet need.”20 While it may appear to some that 
the majority appears to have cherry-picked the prior art and reconstructed 
the invention using the claims as a roadmap (illustrating why the Supreme 
Court might have underestimated the pernicious effects of hindsight in 
obviousness determinations in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex. Inc.21), it is the 
majority’s rejection of Acorda’s third argument that makes this decision 
noteworthy. 
The majority’s consideration of the so-called “secondary 
considerations” (otherwise termed the objective indicia of 
nonobviousness) is grounded in the question of whether the ‘938 patent is 
a “blocking patent” that itself provides the basis for the commercial 
success of Acorda’s Ampyra drug product (rather than any purported 
nonobviousness of the claimed invention).22 The commercial success 
objective indication of nonobviousness requires a nexus between the 
success and the claimed invention; frequently, such assertions are 
rebutted, inter alia, by a patentee’s market power or other alternative 
17. Id. at 1316–17. 
18. Id. at 1314–18. 
19. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d at 1335. 
20. Id. at 1328. 
21. See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
22. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1336–37. 
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explanation for commercial success.23 The majority opinion sets forth the 
court’s precedent based on rebuttal of an assertion of commercial success 
as a basis for nonobviousness in Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc., Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., and Merck Sharp 
& Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.24 In each case, the court held that the 
asserted commercial success did not support nonobviousness due to the 
existence of another patent not at issue in the litigation that explained why 
others had not marketed a competing product.25 Specifically, the majority 
noted that in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. (Merck II) that 
“a blocking patent did not, all by itself, justify discounting evidence of 
commercial success, “calling it a “fact-specific inquiry.”26 The court 
understood Merck II’s reasoning to reflect a common-sense recognition 
that, as a theoretical matter, a blocking patent may or may not deter 
innovation in the blocked space by commercially motivated potential 
innovators other than the owners or licensees of the blocking patent. 
Where the owner of the blocking patent or exclusive licensee is different 
from the owner of the patent in suit, the granting of a license may be a 
realistic possibility. Even where, as here, the owner of the patent-in-suit 
and the exclusive licensee of the blocking patent are the same, a potential 
innovator might or might not think it could successfully challenge the 
blocking patent. Such a potential innovator might or might not be willing 
to do research in the blocked space without a license to a blocking 
patent—even if the research itself is within the safe harbor provided by 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—and wait until the potential inventor has already 
developed and patented an aimed-at improvement to negotiate for a cross-
license with the blocking patent’s owner to share the profits from the 
improvement.27 Besides the assessment of whether the blocking patent 
23. Id. at 1337.
24. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d at 1337–38 (citing Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 
731 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1338 (citing Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 874 F.3d at 730). 
27. The United States Code gives the definition of infringement: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United 
States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug 
or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using 
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes 
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related 
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010) 
9
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can be successfully challenged, a number of other variables appear to the 
Federal Circuit majority generally relevant to this calculus, including the 
following: 
the costliness of the project; the risk of research failure; the nature of 
improvements that might arise from the project, and whether such 
improvements will be entirely covered by the blocking patent; the size 
of the market opportunities anticipated for such improvements; the costs 
of arriving at the improvements and getting them to market; the risk of 
losing the invention race to a blocking-patent owner or licensee; the risk 
that the blocking-patent owner (making its own economic calculations, 
perhaps in light of its own other products or research activities) will 
altogether refuse to grant a license to the improvement or will demand 
so large a share of profits that the whole project is not worthwhile for 
the potential innovator—all evaluated in light of other investment 
opportunities.28 
Taking these factors and the prior art into consideration (including 
the fact that Acorda had been given an exclusive license to Elan’s ‘938 
patent), the majority held that the district court had not erred in its 
analysis, given the deference due to the district court on the factual 
question of commercial success.29 The same blocking effect was also fatal 
(to the panel majority) to the assertion of “long-felt need” and “failure of 
others” as objective indicia of nonobviousness.30 
Not so for Judge Newman, whose dissent illustrates the pitfalls that 
exist in any obviousness determination.31 Judge Newman considered 
exactly the same prior art and evidence that convinced the majority, and 
it convinced her of their error.32 To Judge Newman, the history of the prior 
art was one of failure of many others to achieve the claimed invention.33 
She deemed the “new legal theory” regarding the almost plenary effect of 
blocking patents on the objective indicia not just inimical to the patentee, 
but also to “the afflicted public,” who would have lost the opportunity for 
Ampyra to have been developed if, in prescient retrospect, Acorda had 
foreseen the majority’s outcome.34 Judge Newman cited the prior art as 
showing “decades of failure” to wrestle this unwieldy drug, with its 
28. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1338. 
29. See id. at 1332.
30. Id. at 1341. 
31. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d. at 1342 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 1342–43. 
33. Id. at 1343. 
34. Id. at 1342–43. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss3/2
2018] TOP BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW CASES 2018 647 
“narrow toxic-to-therapeutic range[]” associated with unpredictable and 
severe side-effects, to the reliable therapeutic uses achieved by Acorda: 
The record shows that many scientists in many institutions studied and 
eventually abandoned 4-AP as a treatment prospect for multiple 
sclerosis. These abandoned studies constitute the prior art on which the 
district court and my colleagues rely for obviousness of the Acorda 
Patents. However, the experimentation with 4-AP shows just the 
opposite – it shows that work with 4-AP was abandoned due to the 
inability to balance the compound’s potential effectiveness with its 
toxicity.35 
Over and over, through her litany of the prior art, she showed that the 
majority used prior art to support obviousness that revealed a failure to 
achieve the therapeutic goals without risking (and incurring) serious side 
effects.36 Judge Newman set forth instances where the majority apparently 
ignored or downplayed evidence that prior art upon which their decision 
relied reported abandonment of research and development efforts on 4-
AP due to “toxicity and seizures,” encephalopathy, hepatitis, or 
“dizziness, hypotension, or nausea” that accompanied the drug’s use.37 
The record shows that even Acorda, like all the other researchers, initially 
failed to develop a sustained release formulation and administration 
regimen effective at improving walking speed in multiple sclerosis 
patients, and that it was only when Acorda achieved an “analytical 
breakthrough” (i.e., a reevaluation of the clinical data) that its Ampyra 
product was successfully developed.38 
In addition, with regard to the majority’s base determination of 
obviousness, Judge Newman asserted that: 
[T]he question is not whether these four elements [as set forth above], if 
combined, would produce a successful treatment. The question is 
whether the prior art contains a suggestion or motivation to select these 
four elements from the decades of inconclusive prior art, with a 
reasonable expectation that the selection would eliminate the failures of 
the prior art.39 
35. Id. at 1343. 
36. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. , 903 F.3d. at 1342–54 (Newman, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1347–50. 
38. See id. at 1349–50. 
39. Id. (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent
Litigation, 676 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); Kevin E. Noonan, In re Cyclobenzaprine 
Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litigation (Fed. Cir. 2012), PATENT DOCS (May 9, 
2012), https://www.patentdocs.org/2012/05/in-re-cyclobenzaprine-hydrochloride-extended-release-
capsule-patent-litigation-fed-cir-2012.html [https://perma.cc/7NUN-FSSX]. 
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For Judge Newman, “[t]he years of studies and failures weigh heavily 
against the simplistic post hoc predictability accepted by the court.”40 
Judge Newman found no basis for the majority’s determination that the 
skilled worker would have had a reasoned basis from the art to make the 
selections Acorda did nor any reasonable expectation of success if the 
skilled worker had done so: 
Acorda is correct that there was no suggestion in the prior art that the 
claimed combination should be tried, and there is no hint of a reasonable 
expectation of success. Acorda points to the decades of failure of others 
to develop a safe and effective treatment for multiple sclerosis using 4-
AP, despite its known toxicity.  The district court’s selection of separate 
limitations from separate sources, and retrospectively fitting them into 
the Acorda template, is achieved only with the hindsight knowledge of 
Acorda’s eventual success. Here, only the Acorda Patents teach the 
combination that successfully treats this multiple sclerosis impairment 
while avoiding toxicity and seizures.41 
And with regard to commercial success, Judge Newman’s analysis 
provides a compelling argument that the district court and the majority 
made the wrong comparison in deciding that Elan’s blocking patent was 
relevant to the question: 
Commercial success is measured against the products available for the 
same purpose, not against infringing copies of the patented product. 
Defendants do not contend that they are precluded from providing or 
developing other treatments for multiple sclerosis. The Acorda product 
met a long-felt need, for which the failure of others, despite decades of 
experimenting with the neurological properties of 4-AP, is evidence of 
the unobviousness of the Acorda achievement. Such evidence is an 
important aid to a court that is attempting to divine whether the 
patentee’s discovery was obvious in accordance with law.42 
For good measure, Judge Newman ended her dissent by noting: 
The district court was advised that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
sustained the validity of the Acorda Patents in inter partes review, at 
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA), LLC v. Acorda 
Therapeutics, Inc. . . . . Although the majority reports this event, as did 
40. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1350 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
41. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d. at 1352–53 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The determination of obviousness 
is made with respect to the subject matter as a whole, not separate pieces of the claim.”). 
42. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1353 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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the district court, its consequences are not explored, including issues of 
privity, estoppel, and finality.43 
B. Berkheimer v. HP Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges 
Moore, Taranto, and Stoll; Opinion by Judge Moore). 
This case arose from a patent infringement complaint by sole 
inventor Steven E. Berkheimer against HP alleging infringement of U.S. 
Patent No. 7,447,713.44 HP moved for summary judgment under § 101 on 
claims construed by the district court in a Markman hearing, which the 
court granted, and this appeal followed.45 
The ‘713 patent is directed to “digitally processing and archiving 
files in a digital asset management system” which “parses files into 
multiple objects and tags the objects to create relationships between 
them,” then compares these objects to “archived objects to determine 
whether variations exist based on predetermined standards and rules.”46 
The claimed method “eliminates redundant storage of common text and 
graphical elements, which improves system operating efficiency and 
reduces storage costs.”47 Claims one and four of the ‘713 patent recite: 
1. A method of archiving an item comprising in a computer processing
system: 
presenting the item to a parser; 
         parsing the item into a plurality of multi-part object structures 
wherein portions of the structures have searchable information tags 
associated therewith; 
evaluating the object structures in accordance with object structures 
previously stored in an archive; 
         presenting an evaluated object structure for manual reconciliation 
at least where there is a predetermined variance between the object and 
at least one of a predetermined standard and a user defined rule.48 
. . . 
43. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d. at 1354 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
44. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018); U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713
(filed Oct. 15, 2001). 
45. Id. at 1362–63. 
46. Id. at 1362. 
47. Id. at 1362–63. 
48. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366. 
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4. The method as in claim 1 which includes storing a reconciled object
structure in the archive without substantial redundancy.49 
The district court’s decision granting summary judgment of patent 
ineligibility was grounded in the Supreme Court’s Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank Int’l precedent, which set forth a two-part test to determine whether 
claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.50 In the 
first prong of the test, a court must decide whether a claim is directed to 
one of the judicial exceptions (laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas).51 If so, then the court must further decide under the second 
prong of the Alice/Mayo test whether any element or combination of 
elements in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to 
significantly more than the judicial exception.52 Several Federal Circuit 
cases have established that generic computer implementation of an 
otherwise abstract process does not qualify as “significantly more,” but a 
claimed improvement to a computer or technological process can be 
patent-eligible.53 
Regarding its § 101 analysis, the district court found that claim 1 
satisfied the first prong of the Alice/Mayo test, being directed to “the 
abstract idea of ‘using a generic computer to collect, organize, compare, 
and present data for reconciliation prior to archiving.’”54 The Federal 
Circuit agreed, holding that “claims 1-3 and 9 are directed to the abstract 
idea of parsing and comparing data; claim 4 is directed to the abstract idea 
of parsing, comparing, and storing data; and claims 5-7 are directed to the 
abstract idea of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data.”55 The court 
found analogies between Berkheimer’s claims and those of In re TLI 
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig. and Content Extraction & Transmission 
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n., where claims directed to 
obtaining, processing, and storing data were found to be abstract.56 The 
court rejected Berkheimer’s argument that the claims were not abstract 
because “the ‘parsing’ limitation roots the claims in technology and 
transforms the data structure from source code to object code,” saying 
49. Id. at 1370; U.S. Patent No. 7,447,713 col. 47 ll. 8–30 (filed Oct. 15, 2001).
50. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218 (2014). 
51. Id. at 217. 
52. Id. at 217–18; Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 
88 (2012). 
53. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 573 U.S at 225–26. 
54. Id. at 1366. 
55. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366. 
56. Id. at 1366–67 (citing In re TLI Comm’s LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
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“[t]hat the parser transforms data from source to object code does not 
demonstrate non-abstractness without evidence that this transformation 
improves computer functionality in some way.”57 
Turning to the second prong of the § 101 inquiry, the court reiterated 
that “[t]he second step of the Alice/Mayo test is satisfied when the claim 
limitations ‘involve more than performance of well-understood, routine, 
and conventional activities previously known to the industry.’”58 But the 
court then set forth its novel appreciation of how courts should apply the 
Alice/Mayo test that makes this case noteworthy: 
The question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is 
well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the 
relevant field is a question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is 
pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. Like indefiniteness, enablement, or obviousness, 
whether a claim recites patent eligible subject matter is a question of law 
which may contain underlying facts.59 
The panel found support for its interpretation in Accenture Global 
Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., as well as Justice Breyer’s 
statement from Mayo v. Prometheus, that the § 101 inquiry may overlap 
with fact-sensitive inquiries such as that for novelty under § 102.60 This 
fact-based inquiry will not necessarily arise in every patent-eligibility 
challenge; some § 101 disputes may be resolved as a matter of law when 
there is no material issue of fact regarding whether one or more claim 
elements or combination thereof is well-understood, routine, or 
conventional to a person of ordinary skill in the art.61 Applying these 
principles to the case at bar, the court stated: 
While patent eligibility is ultimately a question of law, the district court 
erred in concluding there are no underlying factual questions to the § 
101 inquiry. Whether something is well-understood, routine, and 
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual 
determination. Whether a particular technology is well-understood, 
routine, and conventional goes beyond what was simply known in the 
prior art. The mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior 
57. Id. at 1367. 
58. Id. (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 225 (2014). 
59. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368 (emphasis added). 
60. Id.; see generally Accenture Glob. Servs. GMBH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 
2d 577 (D. Del. 2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
61. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. 
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art, for example, does not mean it was well-understood, routine, and 
conventional.62 
This reasoning implicates a distinction between whether a technology is 
“known” in the sense of § 102 (e.g., publicly available) and whether one 
of ordinary skill would find this technology to be well-understood, 
routine, and conventional (e.g., something that this person of ordinary 
skill would consider to be textbook knowledge or part of his or her 
ordinary course of activities).63 
Despite enunciating this new interpretation of the Alice/Mayo test, 
the court concluded that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept 
beyond that of the abstract idea therein.64 On the other hand, the Court 
held that claims 4 through 7 recite “limitations directed to the arguably 
unconventional inventive concept described in the specification . . . that 
storing object structures in the archive without substantial redundancy 
improves system operating efficiency and reduces storage costs.”65 This 
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding these claims (i.e., 
“whether claims 4-7 archive documents in an inventive manner that 
improves these aspects of the disclosed archival system”).66 Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit remanded the matter to the district court to make such 
a determination.67 
Prior to this decision, district courts considered questions of patent 
eligibility under § 101 as pure questions of law, typically on motions to 
dismiss early in litigation, and frequently without requiring claim 
construction on that basis. Part of these proceedings have been otherwise-
unsubstantiated allegations that claim elements considered under the 
second prong of the Alice/Mayo test were “well-understood, routine, and 
conventional” without requiring any evidence to support the allegations.68 
Courts have not supported patentees’ supplications that evidence was 
required for this prong. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent 
Office) has taken a similar stance: there has been little support for the 
notion that an examiner need supply facts in support of bald allegations 
of conventionality (albeit typically in the face of disclosure in the 
specification that supports the examiner’s position). This decision 
provides a basis for patentees and forewarned patent applicants to 
62. Id. at 1369. 
63. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1370. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1371. 
68. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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challenge these broad statements of conventionality, and, at a minimum, 
get around presumptive decisions by courts and the Patent Office that 
have heretofore precluded the opportunity to address the factual 
underpinnings vel non of such arguments contrary to patent eligibility. 
C. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Moore, and Reyna; Opinion 
by Judge Moore; concurring opinion by Judge Dyk). 
In St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) of the Patent Office that tribal immunity could not be used to 
shield patents in IPR proceedings by denying the St. Regis Mohawk 
Tribe’s motion to terminate Mylan’s IPR proceedings on these grounds.69 
The issue arose in IPR Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, 
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, and IPR2016-01132 
(and parallel IPRs filed by Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. 
and Akorn, Inc., which had been joined with Mylan’s IPRs), instituted 
against U.S. Patent Nos. 8,685,930, 8,629,111, 8,642,556, 8,633,162, 
8,648,048, and 9,248,191, respectively.70 After the PTAB instituted IPRs 
against these six patents owned by Allergan, and directed to its Restasis 
product, Allergan assigned its rights in the patents to the St. Regis 
Mohawk Tribe (Tribe) in return for a license.71 The Tribe argued 
unsuccessfully before the PTAB that, as the Tribe was the rightful owner 
of the patents, the PTAB lost jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign 
immunity.72 The PTAB held that, as an issue of first impression, the Tribe 
had not borne its burden of showing it was entitled to the requested relief, 
and that the nature of the license left all substantive patent rights with 
69. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
70. U.S. Patent No. 8,685,930 (filed Aug. 7, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,629,111 (filed Aug. 14, 
2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,642,556 (filed Aug. 14, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,633,162 (filed Aug. 14, 
2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,648,048 (filed Aug. 14, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 9,248,191 (filed Mar. 21, 
2014). 
71. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, 5–6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, Allergan Avails Itself of Sovereign Immunity, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 13, 
2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/09/allergan-avails-itself-of-sovereign-immunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/TV8F-VBSK]. 
72. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, 18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, Mohawk Nation Exercises Sovereign Immunity in Inter Partes Review, 
PATENT DOCS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/09/mohawk-nation-exercises-
sovereign-immunity-in-inter-partes-review.html [https://perma.cc/JQ8U-CNVA]. 
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Allergan, which company could thus amply represent the Tribe’s rights, 
even in its absence.73 
The Federal Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore.74 The 
opinion acknowledged the existence of tribal sovereign immunity 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, as described in the Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez75 and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, judicial decisions76 but that this immunity 
“does not extend to actions brought by the federal government.”77 In 
particular, tribal sovereign immunity “does not apply where the federal 
government acting through an agency engages in an investigative action 
or pursues an adjudicatory agency action.”78 However, this exception to 
tribal sovereign immunity does not constitute a blanket rule regarding the 
application of tribal sovereign immunity.79 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Maritime Commission v. 
South Carolina State Ports Authority (FMC)80 formed the basis of the 
panel’s decision. This is appropriate seeing as the Tribe had itself cited 
this case to support its sovereign immunity assertion (even though that 
case involved state, not tribal, sovereign immunity).81 The panel drew its 
distinction on the basis that it considered IPRs to be more akin to federal 
administrative proceedings (in which the federal government is the 
“superior sovereign,” and tribal immunity does not apply) than these 
proceedings are to a dispute between private parties, in which a 
government agency plays an adjudicatory role (as in the FMC 
precedent).82 The opinion distinguished IPRs from the circumstances in 
FMC based on the hybrid nature of IPRs, as the Supreme Court 
characterized these proceedings in Cuozzo Speed Technologies., LLC v. 
73. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, IPR2016–01127, (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23,
2018); Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB Denies St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s Motion to Terminate IPRs based 
on Sovereign Immunity, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/02/ptab-
denies-st-regis-mohawk-tribes-motion-to-terminate-iprs-based-on-sovereign-immunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/S3FJ-PFFT.]  
74. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1324. 
75. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
76. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
77. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1325 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Housing
Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 
827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
78. Id. (citing Pauma v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2018), and Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 122 (1960); Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
79. Id. (citing Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002)). 
80. FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754–56 (2002). 
81. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326. 
82. Id. 
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Lee.83 The Federal Circuit’s opinion further relied upon the Supreme 
Court’s continuation of its explication of the nature of IPRs in its two 
recent decisions on these proceedings, Oil States Energy Services v. 
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC and SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu.84 Under 
these precedents, the panel concluded that there were sufficient 
similarities between IPRs and administrative agency proceedings (here, 
wherein the Patent Office reconsiders the propriety of granting the 
challenged patents) and sufficient differences from more adjudicatory 
proceedings (including the broad and complete discretion vested in the 
Director of the Patent Office on whether to institute an IPR, the absence 
of any requirement that either party continue to participate once an IPR 
has been instituted, and procedural differences relating to, inter alia, 
evidentiary and discovery rules) for tribal sovereign immunity not to 
apply.85 The “government’s central role” in IPRs and the Director’s 
unreviewable discretion (rather than the insistence of a private party) in 
deciding whether to institute IPR proceedings were considerations leading 
to the panel’s conclusion that an “IPR is more like an agency enforcement 
action than a civil suit brought by a private party,” and tribal sovereign 
immunity could not shield the Tribe from the IPRs.86 The opinion notes 
that the Director is politically accountable, sub silentio, acknowledging 
the public policy aspects of the question, both in controlling increased 
drug prices and in the ability of Native American tribes to participate in 
facets of the economy outside casinos and tourism.87 
Also relevant to the panel’s opinion is the capacity of the PTAB to 
continue IPRs after institution even if the petitioner (as in Cuozzo) or 
patent holder declines to participate.88 Finally, substantial differences in 
procedure between IPRs and district court litigation (wherein similarities 
between administrative agency action and district court litigation was 
used to support tribal sovereign immunity in FMC) was another basis for 
the Federal Circuit’s opinion.89 
The opinion avoided Mylan’s other arguments, including that the 
assignment and re-licensing of these patents was a sham, intended by the 
parties to avoid reexamination of these patents, that would thwart 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1326–27. 
85. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Reactive Surfaces Ltd., LLP v. Toyota Motor Corp., IPR2017-00572, 2 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 
2017). 
89. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1328 (“An IPR hearing is nothing like a district 
court patent trial.”). 
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congressional goals of improving patent quality via IPRs that provide a 
means to invalidate improvidently granted patents.90 The panel also 
pointedly stated that its decision was limited to tribal sovereign immunity, 
and that the Court “leave[s] for another day” the question of whether 
States can assert their Eleventh Amendment immunity against IPR 
proceedings (which the court is scheduled to hear in the upcoming 
Ericsson v. University of Minnesota appeal).91 
Judge Dyk wrote a concurring opinion, expressing his views that the 
history of reexamination proceedings before the Patent Office was 
consistent with the panel’s decision to uphold the PTAB’s refusal to 
recognize tribal sovereign immunity in this case.92  
The Tribe thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court,93 which the Court denied.94 
D. Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc. (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Schall and 
Moore; Opinion by Judge Moore). 
In Regents of the University of California v. Broad Institute, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB in an appeal of the CRISPR95 
interference.96 Because the Federal Circuit did not rehear this decision en 
banc (and the parties did not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari), 
the interference between the Broad Institute (Broad) and the University of 
California/Berkeley (UC) is now concluded.97 The court affirmed the 
PTAB’s decision98 that there is no interference-in-fact between Broad’s 
90. Id. 
91. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329. 
92. Id. at 1329–35 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe. et al. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., et al., US__ (No. 18-899). 
94. Kevin E. Noonan, Supreme Court Denied Certiorari Writ by St. Regis Mohawk Indian
Tribe in Restatis® IPR, PATENT DOCS (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/
supreme-court-denied-certiorari-writ-by-st-regis-mohawk-indian-tribe-in-restatis-ipr.html. 
95. CRISPR is an acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats”. In
the context of “gene editing”, CRISPR often functions in conjunction with Cas9 (“CRISPR-associated 
protein 9”), and the combination of the two is also known as “CRISPR-Cas9.” There are other 
CRISPR-associated proteins in addition to type “9”.  
96. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
97. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1297. 
98. Id. at 1289; Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB Decides CRISPR Interference—No interference-in-
fact, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/02/ptab-decides-crispr-
interference-no-interference-in-fact.html [https://perma.cc/HX9Y-NFRR]; Kevin E. Noonan, PTAB 
Decides CRISPR Interference in Favor of Broad Institute—Their Reasoning, PATENT DOCS (Feb. 16, 
2017), https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/02/ptab-decides-crispr-interference-in-favor-of-broad-
institute-their-reasoning.html [https://perma.cc/4959-PNPJ]. 
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twelve patents99 and one application-in-interference and UC’s pending 
patent application.100 
To recap, the PTAB found that there was no interference-in-fact based 
on these requirements: In this proceeding, to prevail on its argument that 
there is no interference, Broad must show that the parties’ claims do not 
meet at least one of the following two conditions: 
1. that, if considered to be prior art to UC’s claims, Broad’s
involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious UC’s
involved claims, or
2. that, if considered to be prior art to Broad’s claims, UC’s
involved claims would not anticipate or render obvious Broad’s 
claims.
Broad will prevail and a determination of no interference-in-fact will be 
made if a preponderance of the evidence indicates one of these 
conditions is not met.101 
In considering the evidence before it, the PTAB gave great weight to 
contemporaneous, cautious statements in the art regarding whether the 
system would work in eukaryotic cells in view of inventor Doudna’s 
disclosure of in vitro CRISPR activity.102 Specifically, these statements 
convinced the PTAB that while the results “suggested the ‘exciting 
possibility’” that CRISPR could be operative in eukaryotic cells: “it was 
not known whether such a bacterial system would function in eukaryotic 
cells”103 and “[i]n another report, Doudna was quoted as stating that she 
had experienced ‘many frustrations’ getting CRISPR to work in human 
cells and that she knew that if she succeeded, CRISPR would be ‘a 
profound discovery.’”104 UC’s assertion of other statements by their 
inventors that could be interpreted more positively did not convince the 
PTAB that there was a reasonable expectation of success in the art for 
getting CRISPR to work in eukaryotic cells,105 with the PTAB stating 
“[a]lthough the statements express an eagerness to learn the results of 
99. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1289–90 (citing U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359 (filed 
Oct. 15, 2013) as being representative). 
100.  Id. at 1289. 
 101.  Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://e-foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd106048-02-15-2017-1 
[https://perma.cc/3T6M-6HQL]. 
102.  Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 21 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1293. 
103.  Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 14 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
104.  Id. at 15. 
105.  Id. 
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experiments in eukaryotic cells and the importance of such results, none 
of them express an expectation that such results would be successful.”106 
The PTAB swept aside UC’s arguments that this reasoning was 
flawed because the standard is not the inventor’s expectations, but those 
of the worker of ordinary skill. The PTAB stated that “if the inventors 
themselves were uncertain, it seems that ordinarily skilled artisans would 
have been even more uncertain.”107 The PTAB also quoted UC’s expert 
as having said (contemporaneously with Professor Doudna’s report of in 
vitro CRISPR activity): “[t]here is no guarantee that [CRISPR] will work 
effectively on a chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid 
can be stabilized in that context.”108 The PTAB concluded that “[w]e fail 
to see how ‘no guarantee’ indicates an expectation of success.”109 
Nor was the PTAB convinced based on the history of the 
development of CRISPR technology, which showed that many 
laboratories independent of the Doudna group quickly applied the new 
technology to manipulate eukaryotic cell genomic DNA110: 
Regardless of how many groups achieved success in eukaryotic cells, 
we are not persuaded that such success indicates there was an 
expectation of success before the results from these experiments were 
known. The unpublished results of research groups are not necessarily 
an indication of whether ordinarily skilled artisans would have expected 
the results achieved. Instead of viewing such work as evidence of an 
expectation of success, we consider the number of groups who 
attempted to use CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells to be evidence of the 
motivation to do so, an issue that is not in dispute. We agree with 
Broad’s argument that a large reward might motivate persons to try an 
experiment even if the likelihood of success is very low.111 
The PTAB found that this evidence further supported its decision that 
there was insufficient evidence of a reasonable expectation of success to 
support UC’s allegation that their earlier work and publications would 
have rendered Broad’s invention obvious.112 This evidence was that 
“differences in gene expression, protein folding, cellular 
compartmentalization, chromatin structure, cellular nucleases, 
intracellular temperature, intracellular ion concentrations, intracellular 
106.  Id. at 17. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 17 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
109.  Id. at 19. 
110.  Id. at 23. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 24. 
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pH, and the types of molecules in prokaryotic versus eukaryotic cells 
would contribute to this unpredictability [regarding whether the CRISPR-
Cas9 system would be operative in eukaryotic cells].”113 In response to 
UC’s allegations that these considerations turned out not to be an 
impediment to CRISPR’s activity in eukaryotic cells, the PTAB said 
“[t]he relevant question before us is whether those of skill in the art would 
have expected there to be problems before the experiments were done,” 
not whether it turned out that the experiments were successful once they 
were tried.114 
Finally, the PTAB rejected UC’s citation of other prokaryotic genetic 
modification systems found to work in eukaryotes, finding that there was 
no commonality in these methods that would have refuted Broad’s 
evidence that the skilled worker would not have had any reasonable 
expectation of success.115 
UC appealed, and on September 10, 2018, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed in an opinion by Judge Moore, joined by Chief Judge Prost and 
Judge Schall.116 After providing a description of CRISPR117, and outlining 
substantive and procedural issues that had been before the PTAB, the 
court addressed the legal arguments proffered by UC in support of its 
argument against the PTAB’s decision of no interference-in-fact.118 As 
stated in the opinion, 
This case turns in its entirety on the substantial evidence standard. The 
[PTAB] found a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a 
reasonable expectation of success in applying the CRISPR-Cas9 system 
in eukaryotic cells. . . . Given the mixture of evidence in the record, we 
hold that substantial evidence supports the [PTAB]’s finding that there 
was not a reasonable expectation of success, and we affirm.119 
The opinion then addressed UC’s two arguments aimed at refuting 
the PTAB’s decision, “that the [PTAB]: (1) improperly adopted a rigid 
test for obviousness that required the prior art contain specific 
instructions, and (2) erred in dismissing evidence of simultaneous 
113.  Broad Inst., Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 29-30 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 
2017). 
114.  Id. at 32. 
115.  Id. at 39. 
116.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
117.  See generally Kevin E. Noonan, CRISPR Interference Declared, PATENT DOCS (Jan. 28, 
2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/01/crispr-interference-declared.html 
[https://perma.cc/MNK6-DEVY]. 
118.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1292. 
119.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1291. 
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invention as irrelevant.”120 The court based its opinion on the evidence 
presented by one of Broad’s experts with regard to the difference between 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells (a distinction Broad recited extensively) 
“that rendered the application of the CRISPR-Cas9 system in eukaryotic 
cells unpredictable.”121 These differences raised issues relevant to 
whether the skilled worker would have had a reasonable expectation of 
success in applying CRISPR to eukaryotic cells, and were also, according 
to the opinion, recognized by UC’s expert, including inter alia statements 
such as, “[t]here is no guarantee that Cas9 will work effectively on a 
chromatin target or that the required DNA-RNA hybrid can be stabilized 
in that context” and “whether the CRISPR-Cas9 system will work in 
eukaryotes ‘remains to be seen’ and ‘[o]nly attempts to apply the system 
in eukaryotes will address these concerns.’”122 This evidence was 
supported, in the panel’s opinion, by UC’s own inventors (including 
Jennifer Doudna), “acknowledging doubts and frustrations about 
engineering CRISPR-Cas9 systems to function in eukaryotic cells and 
noting the significance of Broad’s success.”123 In addition, the court noted 
evidence that other prokaryotic systems adapted to eukaryotic cells 
(“riboswitches, ribozyme systems, and group II introns”) “either [had] 
limited efficacy or the technology required a specific strategy to adapt it 
for use in eukaryotic cells.”124 According to the court, this amounted to 
substantial evidence that the skilled worker would not have had a 
reasonable expectation of success in achieving CRISPR in eukaryotic 
cells.125 The opinion recognized that UC had presented evidence in 
support of its position, but noted “[w]e are, however, an appellate body. 
We do not reweigh the evidence. It is not our role to ask whether 
substantial evidence supports fact-findings not made by the [PTAB], but 
instead whether such evidence supports the findings that were in fact 
made.”126 
The opinion also rejected UC’s arguments that the PTAB had used a 
rigid test that required specific instructions in the prior art, and ignored 
the “inferences and creative steps” recognized as being relevant to an 
obviousness determination under the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.127 With regard to “simultaneous invention” 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 1292. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. at 1293. 
124.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1293. 
125.  Id. at 1294. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 420 (2007)). 
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evidence (which UC argued the PTAB ignored), the opinion states that 
while “[s]imultaneous invention may serve as evidence of obviousness 
when considered in light of all of the circumstances,”128 the existence of 
interferences means that simultaneous invention cannot, by itself, be 
evidence of obviousness.129 The Federal Circuit rejected UC’s argument 
that evidence that six independent research groups applied CRISPR to 
eukaryotic cells “within a short period of time” after publication of its 
discovery on prokaryotes rendered Broad’s claims obvious, and approved 
the legal rationale used by the PTAB:130 
The [PTAB] explained that “[e]ach case s particular context, including 
the characteristics of the science or technology, its state of advance, the 
nature of the known choices, the specificity or generality of the prior art, 
and the predictability of results in the area of interest.” . . . (quoting 
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). We 
do not see any error in this analysis.131 
An important consequence of this decision is that the status quo will 
remain unchanged: Broad will maintain its extensive CRISPR patent 
portfolio and UC’s patent application (reciting claims broader than 
Broad’s and encompassing CRISPR without regard to the cells in which 
it is practiced) will have been granted by the Patent Office as a patent in 
due course.132 Under these circumstances, a third party wishing to practice 
the technology in eukaryotic cells (encompassing everything from yeast 
to humans) would need a license from both UC and Broad (absent the 
parties coming to an agreement on how their overlapping technologies 
will be licensed). This situation of blocking patents could hinder 
commercial adoption of powerful new gene editing techniques. However, 
the prospect of holding back such a revolutionary and potentially 
beneficial new biotechnology should provide further impetus for some 
sort of co-licensing agreement between the parties to be forged. 
E. Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC 
(2018) (Opinion of the Court by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan; 
concurring opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg 
 128.  Id. at 1295 (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 
F.2d 1452, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
129.  Id. 
130.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 903 F.3d at 1296. 
131.  Id. 
132.  U.S. Patent No. 10,266,850; see, Kevin E Noonan, Another U.S. Patent Issued for CRISPR 
(Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/04/another-us-patent-issued-for-crispr.html. 
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and Sotomayor; dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts). 
On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court held in Oil States Energy 
Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC that IPR proceedings 
violate neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment of the 
Constitution.133 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained that a 
grant of a patent is a matter involving a public right, not a private right, 
and falls within the public rights doctrine as involving the same 
considerations involved in a grant of a patent.134 The majority noted that 
“[p]atent claims are granted subject to the qualification that the [Patent 
Office] has ‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent 
claim’ in an inter partes review” and this removes any constitutional 
infirmity for an Article I court (the PTAB) relieving a patentee of an 
improvidently granted patent right.135 The majority opinion and the 
dissent both based their decisions on McCormick Harvesting Machine v. 
Aultman.136 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent relied upon the broad language of 
that case that “[t]he only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to 
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of 
the United States, and not in the department which issued the patent.”137 
However, the majority pointed out that this is “best read as a description 
of the statutory scheme that existed at that time,” and did not address 
whether Congress had authority to establish an entirely different 
scheme138 (which it has done repeatedly since 1980 with passage of the 
amendment to the Patent Act authorizing ex parte reexamination).139 In 
fact, before the 1870 change to the patent statute discussed in that case, 
Congress provided examiners with absolute discretion to cancel any 
reintroduced original claim in a reissue proceeding.140 Congress withdrew 
this grant of authority before McCormick Harvesting, which made the 
Patent Office’s cancellation of original claims in reissue proceedings a 
violation of due process and an invasion on the then-exclusive jurisdiction 
of the judicial branch by the executive.141 
133.  Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018). 
134.  Id. at 1373. 
135.  Id. at 1374. 
136.  See id. at 1369 (citing McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898)). 
137.  Id. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
138.  Id. at 1376 (majority opinion). 
139.  35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
140.  Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1376. 
141.  Id.  
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The Court stressed, however, that its holding was limited to the 
question of the constitutionality of IPRs only.142 For example, the Court 
pointed out that “Oil States [did] not challenge the retroactive application 
of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when 
its patent issued.”143 In addition, the Court noted that it was not 
determining that IPR proceedings could not raise due process concerns.144 
Finally, the Court emphasized that the holding should not be misconstrued 
to suggest that other constitutional challenges could not be made; for 
example, challenges related to the Due Process Clause or the Takings 
Clause.145 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence that was joined by Justices 
Ginsberg and Sotomayor.146 Even though he joined the Court’s opinion in 
full, Justice Breyer wrote to stress that the decision should not be read as 
stating that matters involving private rights could never be adjudicated 
outside of Article III courts.147 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, joined by the Chief Justice,148 explained 
that the history of the patent system and the prior case law required the 
finding that patents are private rights, and therefore must be adjudicated 
in Article III courts.149 
F. SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu (2018) (Opinion of the Court by Justice 
Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito; dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg, joined 
by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan; dissenting opinion by 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, and 
joined except as to Part III-A by Justice Kagan). 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit on 
April 24, 2018,, in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu.150 In a rare close decision 
in a patent case, Justice Gorsuch (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) provided a textual explication of the IPR 
statute in deciding that the Patent Office was compelled to render a final 
written decision (FWD) on all claims challenged by a petitioner in an IPR 
142.  Id. at 1379.  
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. at 1379–80 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
147.  Id. at 1379. 
148.  Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
149.  Id. at 1380–86. 
150.  See generally SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). 
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petition.151 This decision overruled the Patent Office’s practice that the 
Director (through the PTAB) could institute an IPR on less than all 
challenged claims and then limit the FWD to only the instituted claims.152 
According to the majority, the decision to institute is binary (either 
the PTAB decides to institute or not), but once instituted, the PTAB must 
render a decision on all challenged claims.153 Justice Gorsuch in his 
opinion set forth the relevant statutory language he believed supported the 
Court’s opinion and the various procedures (one “inquisitorial” in nature, 
like ex parte reexamination, in contrast to the more adjudicatory IPR 
procedure).154 IPRs “look[] a good deal more like civil litigation” and are 
governed by express provisions in the statute regarding the standards for 
instituting an IPR (§§ 311–14), conducting the IPR proceeding (§ 316), 
settlement (§ 317), and coming to a final decision on patentability 
(§ 318).155 
Justice Gorsuch’s interpretation of the language of the statute is 
based on earlier instances of statutory interpretation by the Court along 
with reference to dictionaries and legal scholarship.156 Important terms in 
the statute include the use of the word “any” in 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (that 
the Patent Office “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the 
patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner”) to mean 
“every,” stating that “[t]he [Patent Office] cannot curate the claims at 
issue but must decide [the validity] of them all.”157 This interpretation is 
further supported by the use of the word “shall,” which the opinion notes 
“generally imposes a nondiscretionary duty.”158 This language provides a 
“ready answer” to the question presented, the opinion stating that the 
language of § 318(a) is “both mandatory and comprehensive” with regard 
to the statutory requirement that the PTAB render a FWD on all claims 
challenged in an IPR petition.159 
While stating that this analysis “would seem to make this an easy 
case,” the opinion reviewed (and rejected) the Director’s arguments to the 
contrary.160 The majority found no basis in the statute for the Director to 
151.  Id. at 1358. 
152.  37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2016), abrogated by SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360. 
153.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355. 
154.  Id. at 1353. 
155.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1353–54. 
156.  Id. at 1354. 
157.  Id. at 1353. 
158.  Id. at 1354. 
159.  Id.  
160.  Id. at 1355. 
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have discretion regarding “partial institution.”161 Indeed, the opinion 
noted that, unlike in ex parte reexamination, the IPR provisions of the 
statute do not permit the Director to initiate an IPR sua sponte.162 “From 
the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which it’s 
the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the 
proceeding.”163 
The Court majority also found interpretive meaning in further 
distinctions between IPR proceedings and ex parte reexamination.164 In 
the latter proceedings, Congress chose “an inquisitorial approach” 
(analogous to ex parte examination in the first instance) and thus Congress 
“knew exactly how to” expressly give the Director the discretion he 
argues he has under the IPR provisions of the America Invents Act.165 
“Congress’s choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is 
a choice neither we nor the agency can disregard.”166 
Further, the Court’s opinion cited the language of § 314, which 
appears to provide either that the IPR proceedings be instituted or that 
they are not, based on the provision that the Director must decide 
“‘whether to institute an inter partes review . . . pursuant to the 
petition.’”167 Both the terms “whether” and “pursuant to the petition” had 
meaning to the Court majority. “Whether” to institute an IPR implies a 
“yes or no” option, and “pursuant to the petition” supports the earlier-
stated view that what is instituted is an IPR on the claims challenged by 
the petitioner.168 As stated in the opinion, “[n]othing suggests the Director 
enjoys a license to depart from the petition and institute a different inter 
partes review of his own design.”169 
The majority also held that this portion of the statute, which the 
Director relied upon to imply discretion based on the language that the 
Director should institute if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that “at least 
1 of the claims challenged in the petition” is invalid, implies exactly the 
opposite.170 For the Court majority, “[o]nce that single claim threshold is 
satisfied, it doesn’t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any 
161.  Id. at 1358. 
162.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1355. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. at 1353 (citing Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353–
54 (2013)). 
167.  Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)). 
168.  Id. at 1355–56. 
169.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1356 (emphasis in original). 
170.  Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2011). 
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additional claims”; the Director should institute the IPR on all challenged 
claims.171 The opinion again references the ex parte reexamination statute 
to show that if Congress had intended to give the Director the discretion 
he claims, there was language available to do so.172 
The opinion summarily rejected the Director’s reliance on his 
discretion under § 314 to institute an IPR to support his discretion to 
institute partially, once again characterizing the decision as binary.173 This 
conclusion is supported, according to the opinion, by the language of the 
other provisions in the statute which reference “the petition” rather than 
challenged claims, the majority interpreting Congress not to have intended 
the Director to have discretion other than whether or not to institute an 
IPR against the claims the petitioner challenged.174 
With regard to the ambiguity purported to be in the statute due to 
slight differences in the language of § 314 and § 318 (which forms the 
basis for the dissent’s position), the majority asserted that this is just a 
“slight linguistic discrepancy.”175 Any differences between the claims 
challenged in the petition and the claims available for FWD can be 
explained by the patentee’s ability to cancel or amend claims, according 
to the opinion (terming it a “winnowing mechanism”).176 The opinion 
states that “[w]e need not and will not invent an atextual explanation for 
Congress’s drafting choices when the statute’s own terms supply an 
answer.”177 
Neither were the Director’s policy arguments persuasive (in contrast 
to the effects of these arguments on the dissenting Justices). Even though 
“[e]ach side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the 
more efficient policy[,] who should win that debate isn’t our call to make,” 
because “[p]olicy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this 
Court.”178 And “[w]hatever its virtues or vices, Congress’ prescribed 
policy here is clear: the petitioner in an inter partes review is entitled to a 
decision on all the claims it has challenged” stated the Court, nicely 
closing the door on the basis for the dissenting Justices’ contrary 
opinion.179 
171.  SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1356 (emphasis in original). 
172.  Id. 
173.  See id. at 1355–56. 
174.  Id. at 1356–57.
175.  SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. at 1357. 
176.  Id.  
177.  Id. (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989)).
178.  Id. at 1357–58.
179.  Id. at 1358.
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Because the majority saw no ambiguity in the statutory language, 
deference to the agency’s implementation decisions under Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council did not apply.180 In an interesting side 
note (with regard to Justice Gorsuch’s acknowledged antipathy to 
Chevron), the majority deigned to leave the continued vitality of the 
agency deference doctrine “for another day,” merely holding that “we owe 
an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference” if there is (as here, for 
these Justices) no ambiguity in the statute’s mandate.181 
And not surprisingly, the Court rejected the Director’s final argument 
that the question before it was one regarding the institution decision, 
which Congress under § 314(d) put beyond judicial review.182 The 
majority reminded the Director that Cuozzo recognized a “strong 
presumption” of judicial review of agency decisions, and that judicial 
review was necessary to preclude agency “shenanigans” that would 
“exceed its ‘statutory bounds.’”183 
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan.184 These Justices perceived that there was an ambiguity in the 
statute resulting from differences in language (albeit slight) between § 314 
and § 318 sufficient to support both the Director’s application of the 
statute and entitlement to Chevron deference.185 To the dissenters, the 
statutory language is far from being as clear as the majority believed: to 
them, the statute is “technical, unclear, and constitutes a minor procedural 
part of a larger administrative scheme.”186 The dissent expressly relied 
upon Chevron, characterizing it as “an interpretative technique that judges 
often use in such cases” where the statute contains an ambiguity (and 
perhaps setting the terms of a future dispute between the Justices on the 
question of Chevron deference).187 Using this technique, the dissent found 
such an ambiguity, and, further, found that the Director’s interpretation of 
the ambiguous statutory language is reasonable (and thus the dissenting 
Justices would have affirmed).188 Helpful in considering the dissenting 
Justices’ thinking in this regard, Justice Breyer set forth a hypothetical (as 
is his wont) in which a petitioner challenges sixteen claims and the PTAB 
180.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
181.  SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1358.
182.  Id. at 1360 (citing Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016)). 
183.  Id.
184.  Id. at 1360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
185.  Id. at 1361–65. 
186.  Id. at 1360.
187.  Id.
188.  See SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360. 
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institutes an IPR on one of them, and then used this hypothetical as a 
practical guidepost for his explication of the statutory language.189 
The dissenting opinion performed its own brand of statutory exegesis 
and, unsurprisingly, found ambiguity between reference to claims 
challenged in the petition and claims surviving to FWD.190 These Justices 
perceived that the majority relied on its own language that does not 
actually exist in the statute (specifically “‘any patent claim challenged by 
the petitioner’ in the petitioner’s original petition”) and, for them, 
“[w]hich reading we give the statute [their’s or the majority’s] makes a 
difference.”191 Without expressly making the point, the dissent illustrated 
that, if these Justices could not agree on the meaning of the statutory 
language, such language is prima facie ambiguous and thus Chevron 
deference should attach to the Director’s interpretation.192 
In addition, these Justices agreed with the Director’s argument that 
interpreting the statute as the majority did would impose tremendous 
inefficiencies on the PTAB, requiring the PTAB to provide a FWD on 
claims that the petitioner had not shown had a reasonable likelihood of 
being invalid.193 This point was emphasized in a one-paragraph, separate 
dissent penned by Justice Ginsberg (joined by the other dissenting 
Justices), who saw “no cause to believe Congress wanted the [PTAB] to 
spend its time so uselessly.”194 
One practical consequence of this decision (that Justice Breyer in his 
dissent fully appreciated) is that it provides a route for a petitioner, 
unhappy that the PTAB refused to institute IPR on any particular claim, 
to appeal the FWD and thus overcome the prohibition in the statute that 
the institution decision is at the Director’s discretion, and not appealable. 
This is clearly contrary to the legislative scheme (and Justice Sotomayor, 
one of the dissenting Justices here, at oral argument quizzed counsel 
aggressively on whether the entire exercise was a way to get around the 
Court’s Cuozzo decision).195 This decision also raises the possibility that 
the PTAB, rather than issue an appealable FWD on claims that do not rise 
to the “reasonable likelihood” standard, will instead refuse to institute 
using language in the decision providing a roadmap for further petitions 
of more limited scope that it will institute. No matter how the PTAB 
189.  Id. at 1361. 
190.  Id.  
191.  Id. at 1361–62. 
192.  See id. at 1360. 
193.  See id. 
194.  See SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1360 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
195.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–11, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (No. 
16-969). 
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adapts its practices to avoid the outcome mandated by this decision, the 
majority’s clear holding provides the basis for the Patent Office and the 
public to petition Congress to intercede to change the statutory language 
to give the Director the discretion the Court majority could not find in the 
statute Congress enacted. 
G. Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Panel: Chief Judge Prost 
and Circuit Judges Taranto and Hughes; Opinion by Chief Judge 
Prost) 
On October 5, 2017, the Federal Circuit rendered a decision in 
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi that brought clarity to how the Court (and Patent 
Office) should apply the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 
112(a) to properly circumscribe the scope of claims to monoclonal 
antibodies.196 As a bonus, the panel opined on the relationship between 
the various requirements for a court to grant a permanent injunction when 
the infringing article comprises a medicine or other therapeutic agent.197 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent focus on patent law questions 
(and the uncertainty and jurisprudential chaos that has arisen as a 
consequence), the Federal Circuit spent almost a decade refining 
application of the written description requirement to biotechnology patent 
claims. Arguably beginning with Amgen v. Chugai198 and Fiers v. 
Revel,199 the Court spoke most clearly in University of California v. Eli 
Lilly & Co.200; this jurisprudence matured in University of Rochester v. 
G.D. Searle201 and Enzo Biochem v. GenProbe,202 culminating in the 
Court’s Ariad v. Eli Lilly203 en banc decision that the written description 
and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (now, 35 
U.S.C. § 112(a)), were separate and distinct and could be differentially 
satisfied on the same disclosure (i.e., enablement could be satisfied even 
though the written description requirement was not).204 
196.  See generally Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, Amgen 
Inc. v. Sanofi, 139 S. Ct. 787 (2019). 
197.  See id. 
198.  Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
199.  Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
200.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
201.  Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
202.  Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
203.  Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
204.  See generally Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d 1200; Fiers, 984 F.2d 1164; Regents of the Univ. of 
California, 119 F.3d 1559; Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d 916; Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956; Ariad 
Pharm., 598 F.3d 1336 (en banc).
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These cases arose from the complexities of assessing the sufficiency 
of disclosure for claims to isolated nucleic acids (including cDNA 
molecules that remain patent-eligible after AMP v. Myriad Genetics).205 
Another complex class of important biomolecules, antibodies, and, in 
particular, monoclonal antibodies, have had a more murky course through 
§ 112 jurisprudence; the issue in the few decided cases related to the
requirements for producing humanized and ultimately human antibodies 
from (typically) mouse monoclonal progenitors rather than the scope of 
antibody claims as they relate to antigenic specificity.206 The Federal 
Circuit’s decision in this case provides some clarity in this regard.207 
The case arose when Amgen sued Sanofi over its sales of Praluent 
(alirocumab) in competition with Amgen’s Repatha (evolocumab) drug; 
Amgen’s asserted patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 8,829,165 (165 patent) and 
8,859,741(741 patent), claim a genus of antibodies that encompass 
Sanofi’s Praluent product.208 As background, blood plasma contains low-
density lipoproteins that bind cholesterol and are associated with athero-
sclerotic plaque formation.209 Liver cells express receptors for LDL 
(LDL-R) wherein binding thereto reduces the amount of LDL cholesterol 
in blood and reduces the risk of plaque formation and cardiovascular dis-
ease.210 PCSK9 (proprotein convertase subtilisin kexin type 9) is a mole-
cule that binds to and causes liver cell LDL-R to be destroyed, thus reduc-
ing the capacity and effectiveness of the liver cell’s ability to reduce serum 
LDL-cholesterol.211 The antibodies at issue in this suit bind to PCSK9 and 
prevent PCSK9 from binding to LDL-R, causing their destruction and 
hence improving the capacity of the liver to clear the blood of serum cho-
lesterol.212 Claim 1 of the ‘165 patent is representative: 
1. An isolated monoclonal antibody, wherein, when bound to
PCSK9, the monoclonal antibody binds to at least one of the 
following residues: S153, I154, P155, R194, D238, A239, I369, 
S372, D374, C375, T377, C378, F379, V380, or S381 of SEQ ID 
205.  See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, Amgen Inc. 
v. Sanofi, 139 S. Ct. 787 (2019). 
206.  Id.  
207.  Id.  
208.  U.S. Patent No. 8,829,165 (filed Apr. 10, 2013); U.S. Patent No. 8,859,741 (filed Apr. 24, 
2014). 
209.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id.
212.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371. 
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NO:3, and wherein the monoclonal antibody blocks binding of 
PCSK9 to LDL[-]R.213 
It is important to note that, while reciting the structure of the residues on 
PCSK9 that are bound by the claimed antibody, the claim does not recite 
any structural limitations of the antibody itself. The only antibody 
characteristic recited as a limitation is a functional one, i.e., the ability to 
bind (and not even specifically bind) to at least one of the recited PCSK9 
residues. 
Evidence at trial showed that Amgen had produced a plurality of 
anti-PCSK9 antibodies and screened them for the ability to inhibit PCSK9 
binding to LDL-R in the liver.214 This screening was done using a “trial 
and error” process that reduced 3,000 human monoclonal antibodies down 
to 85 antibodies that “blocked interaction between the PCSK9 . . . and the 
LDLR [at] greater than 90%,” of which the specification illustrated the 
three-dimensional binding arrangement for two (one of which became the 
Repatha™ antibody) by x-ray crystallography.215 The specification of the 
Amgen patents in suit discloses amino acid sequence information for 22 
human anti-PCSK9 antibodies able to compete for PCSK9 binding with 
these two more fully characterized antibodies.216 Regeneron’s patents (not 
at issue here) recited antibody-specific amino acid sequences for its 
claimed anti-PCSK9 antibodies.217 
The jury found Amgen’s patents not to be invalid; Sanofi stipulated 
to infringement.218 The district court excluded Sanofi’s evidence relating 
to written description and enablement based on Praluent and other post-
priority date antibodies (i.e., that were produced after Amgen’s earliest 
priority date).219 The district court, relying on Noelle v. Lederman220 as 
precedent, instructed the jury that an applicant can be entitled to claim 
scope encompassing generically described antibodies (as was the case for 
Amgen’s claims) provided that the applicant provided a full characterized, 
novel antigen:221 
In the case of a claim to antibodies, the correlation between structure 
and function may also be satisfied by the disclosure of a newly 
213.  Id. at 1372. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1372. 
217.  See id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id.  
220.  Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
221.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1376. 
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characterized antigen by its structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties if you find that the level of skill and knowledge in 
the art of antibodies at the time of filing was such that production of 
antibodies against such an antigen was conventional or routine.222 
The district court denied Sanofi’s post-trial motion for judgment as 
a matter of law (JMOL) that Amgen’s claims were invalid for failing the 
written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), 
and granted Amgen’s motion for JMOL that the claims were 
nonobvious.223 On this record, the district court also granted Amgen a 
permanent injunction preventing Sanofi from selling Praluent (which was 
stayed pending Sanofi’s appeal).224 
The Federal Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, 
and remanded, in an opinion by Chief Judge Prost, joined by Judges 
Taranto and Hughes.225 The opinion distinguished two bases for a court 
to consider post-priority date evidence of failure to satisfy the written 
description requirement, and found that the district court misapplied the 
law in excluding Sanofi’s evidence.226 The first basis for considering post-
filing evidence regarding written description is when the evidence is 
proffered to show whether there was sufficient disclosure in the 
specification as filed and for this purpose the panel stated that post-
priority date evidence is improper.227 Here, Sanofi’s evidence was 
proffered under the second basis, which is whether the specification 
discloses a representative number of species in a claimed genus.228 For 
such purposes, the opinion held that post-priority evidence is admissible, 
because such evidence can show that the genus is sufficiently diverse that 
the number of species disclosed in the specification is not 
representative.229 As set forth in Ariad, an adequate written description of 
a genus requires the specification to disclose “a representative number of 
species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features 
common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can 
‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.”230 The panel 
222.  Id.; see also Noelle, 355 F.3d 1343. 
223.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371; see generally Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 227 F. Supp. 3d 333 (D. Del. 
2017). 
224.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1371, 1373. 
225.  Id. at 1371. 
226.  Id. at 1372. 
227.  Id. at 1373–74. 
228.  Id. at 1374. 
229.  Id. at 1375. 
230.  Id. at 1373 (citing Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2010)). 
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distinguished prior precedent cited by Amgen, including In re Koller231, 
and In re Hogan232, because those cases were directed to the first basis for 
evaluating whether a specification satisfies the written description 
requirement.233 (Another reason is that the second basis recognized by the 
opinion is arguably a creation of the Federal Circuit’s more recent written 
description jurisprudence.)234 
The opinion acknowledged that the Court had not directly addressed 
this application of the law to date, but found it to be consistent with the 
Court’s earlier decision in AbbVie.235 In AbbVie, the accused infringer 
used evidence from its own, later-developed antibodies to show that 
patentee AbbVie’s claims were not supported by an adequate written 
description of a representative number of species within the claimed 
antibody genus (although, as the opinion admits, defendant’s antibody 
“was a basis for the unrepresentativeness ruling without regard to whether 
it postdated the patent’s priority date”).236 With regard to the Hogan 
precedent (which is binding on Federal Circuit panel opinions unless 
overturned by the en banc Court), the opinion states: 
Appellees misread In re Hogan by conflating the difference between 
post-priority-date evidence proffered to illuminate the post-priority-date 
state of the art, which is improper, with post-priority-date evidence 
proffered to show that a patent fails to disclose a representative number 
of species. In re Hogan prohibits the former but is silent with respect to 
the latter.237 
Hogan was based on the Patent Office requiring an applicant to 
disclose, at an application’s filing date, species that did not exist at that 
time.238 The panel understood that not to be analogous to the case before 
it, and stated that as a consequence, the district court’s exclusion of 
Sanofi’s evidence relating to whether Amgen’s specification disclosed a 
representative number of species was error.239 The Court remanded the 
matter to the district court for a new trial on this issue.240 
231.  In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 825 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
232.  In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
233.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1373. 
234.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1374–75; see AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, 
Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
235.  Id. at 1374. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Id. at 1374─75. 
238.  See generally In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
239.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1375. 
240.  Id. 
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The Court also found it to be error for the district court to have 
excluded evidence regarding enablement on the same grounds. This 
evidence related to the “lengthy and potentially undue experimentation” 
Amgen needed to employ to arrive at its antibodies that fell within the 
scope of the claims of the ‘165 and ‘741 patents.241 This was relevant 
evidence not barred by its post-priority date origins, and the panel 
remanded for a new trial on enablement in light of this evidence.242 
Perhaps the most significant portion of the opinion involves the jury 
instructions, which relied on Noelle v. Lederman for the proposition that 
characterizing a new antigen was sufficient to satisfy the statute for claims 
encompassing a broad genus of antibodies that could bind to the new 
antigen.243 The panel found that this instruction “is not legally sound and 
[] not based on any binding precedent”, and then provided its legal 
analysis of Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,244 Noelle v. 
Lederman,245 and Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs246 in 
support of its conclusion.247 
The basis for the instruction, according to the opinion, is in 
guidelines from the Patent Office discussed by the Court in Enzo.248 
There, the Court noted (in dicta, as characterized in this opinion), that the 
Patent Office would find claims to an antibody in compliance with Section 
112 “notwithstanding the functional definition of the antibody, in light of 
the well-defined structural characteristics for the five classes of antibody, 
the functional characteristics of antibody binding, and the fact that the 
antibody technology is well developed and mature.”249 The decision in 
Noelle was actually contrary (the claims were not entitled to priority to an 
earlier application because that application did not disclose “the structural 
elements of the antibody or antigen”) but (again in dicta) stated that “as 
long as an applicant has disclosed a ‘fully characterized antigen,’ either 
by its structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties, or by 
depositing the protein in a public depository, the applicant can then claim 
an antibody by its binding affinity to that described antigen” based on the 
Court’s Enzo decision.250 Finally, in Centocor, the Court questioned, as 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
243.  See id. at 1376. 
244.  Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
245.  Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
246.  Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
247.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1376. 
248.  Id. 
249.  Id. (citing Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 964). 
250.  Id. at 1377 (citing Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1349). 
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Amgen did here, the interpretation of its precedent that an applicant was 
entitled to a broad claim based solely on functional properties (e.g., 
binding affinity or specificity) of an antibody so long as the applicant 
provided a fully characterized, novel antigen.251 As expressed in 
Centocor, one basis for skepticism over the “fully characterized antigen” 
test advocated there and here (by Amgen) was that instead of “analogizing 
the antibody-antigen relationship to a ‘key in a lock’, it was more apt to 
analogize it to a lock and ‘a ring with a million keys on it.’”252 The panel 
emphasized that because the written description requirement is a question 
of fact, the value of these cases as precedent is “extremely limited.”253 
The panel held this instruction to be improper because it effectively 
eliminated the written description requirement from the statute in favor of 
enablement, contrary to the Court’s en banc decision in Ariad, stating that 
“[b]y permitting a finding of adequate written description merely from a 
finding of ability to make and use, the challenged sentence of the jury 
instruction in this case ran afoul of what is perhaps the core ruling of 
Ariad.”254 And the panel found that whether the relationship between the 
structure of the antigen, no matter how fully characterized, and any of its 
cognate antibodies is (here and hitherto) “hotly disputed” which precluded 
the Court from making any definitive finding.255 The panel recited its 
abrogation of the “fully characterized antigen” test expressly: 
Further, the “newly characterized antigen” test flouts basic legal 
principles of the written description requirement. Section 112 requires a 
“written description of the invention.” But this test allows patentees to 
claim antibodies by describing something that is not the invention, i.e., 
the antigen. The test thus contradicts the statutory “quid pro quo” of the 
patent system where “one describes an invention, and, if the law’s other 
requirements are met, one obtains a patent.” Indeed, we have generally 
eschewed judicial exceptions to the written description requirement 
based on the subject matter of the claims.256 
For the same reasons the opinion affirmed the district court’s denial 
of JMOL that Amgen’s claims lack written description and enablement in 
251.  See id. at 1377. 
 252.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1377 (emphasis in original) (citing Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
253.  Id. (citing Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1349). 
254.  Id. at 1378. 
255.  Id. 
256.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1378–79 (citations omitted). 
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favor of those questions being decided on remand based on the facts 
properly permitted to be considered by the jury.257 
Turning to the grounds for granting Amgen a permanent injunction, 
the panel found error in how the district court applied the standards 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.:258 
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor 
test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.259 
Here, the district court granted the injunction despite finding that an 
injunction would “disserve” the public interest in the absence of plaintiff 
Amgen refuting this conclusion.260 The panel’s plain reading of the 
Supreme Court’s mandate held this to be error.261 In addition, the panel 
held to be error the district court’s finding that the public interest would 
be disserved because the effect of the injunction would be to “tak[e] an 
independently developed, helpful drug off the market.”262 According to 
the opinion, using this standard a court would never be able to enjoin an 
infringing drug product because that would always involve taking a 
helpful drug off the market, contrary to both eBay and 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(4)(B).263 
This case is the latest application of the Federal Circuit’s written 
description doctrine, which is one of the few areas that the Supreme Court 
has not found it fit to question the Court’s application of U.S. patent law. 
On the one hand this is curious, because written description is perhaps the 
preeminent example of the Federal Circuit exercising its special expertise 
and Congressional mandate to provide a harmonized interpretation of 
patent law. On the other hand, how the Federal Circuit has developed this 
area of the law has, generally, limited the scope of biotechnology patent 
claims, consistent with the Supreme Court’s penchant for treating the 
patent grant parsimoniously. In any case, this decision makes the 
257.  See id. at 1380. 
258.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
259.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added) (quoting MercExchange 547 U.S. at 391). 
260.  Id.  
261.  See id.  
262.  Id.  
263.  Sanofi, 872 F.3d at 1381 (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
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application of the written description requirement, as applied to antibody 
claims, more consistent with how the Court has applied § 112 to other 
biotechnological inventions, and, thus, is in keeping with past twenty 
years of the Court’s jurisprudence. It is also more congruent with how the 
technology has developed since monoclonal antibodies were first 
disclosed (but not patented) by Kohler and Milstein in 1973. If such 
consistency is the proper role of the Federal Circuit, then this decision is 
an exemplar of it fulfilling that role. 
H. Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc. (2017) (Opinion of the Court by Justice 
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Gorsuch, Kagan, Kennedy, Sotomayor; concurring 
opinion by Justice Breyer) 
On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion 
in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., marking the first time the Court has 
interpreted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) 
for the approval of biosimilar drugs.264 The Court described the statute as 
“a carefully calibrated scheme for preparing to adjudicate, and then 
adjudicating, claims of infringement” related to biosimilar 
applications.265 This process begins with the disclosure by the biosimilar 
applicant of its an abbreviated Biologics License Application (aBLA) and 
related information in order to “enable the sponsor to evaluate the 
biosimilar for possible infringement of patents it holds on the reference 
product . . . .”266 Nevertheless, the Court held that the reference product 
sponsor (RPS) cannot seek enforcement of the disclosure provision in 42 
U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) by injunction under federal law,267 substantially 
agreeing with the Federal Circuit.268 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for the Federal Circuit to consider the question 
whether the disclosure provision was enforceable under state law, or 
whether the BPCIA pre-empted any state law claim.269 With regard to the 
180-day notice-of-commercial-marketing provision of the statute, the 
Court reversed the Federal Circuit and held that the notice may be 
provided “either before or after receiving FDA approval.”270 
264.  Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
265.  Id. at 1670. 
266.  Id. at 1670–71. 
267.  Id. at 1674. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. at 1676–77. 
270.  Id. at 1677. 
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In 2014 Sandoz became the first company to file an aBLA pursuant 
to the BPCIA’s abbreviated pathway found at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k).271 This 
application was for approval to market a biosimilar version of Amgen’s 
Neupogen (filgrastim) biologic drug product.272 Filgrastrim is a 175 
amino acid recombinant methionyl human granulocyte colony-
stimulating factor (r-metHuG-CSF), and is often prescribed for cancer 
patients on chemotherapy at times when patients are at most risk of 
infection because their white blood cell count is low.273 However, despite 
availing itself of this pathway for FDA approval, Sandoz refused to 
participate in the patent resolution component (the disclosure and 
information exchange provisions, also known colloquially as the “patent 
dance”), alleging that it was not a mandatory component.274 Amgen 
responded by filing suit on October 24, 2014, requesting in part a 
preliminary injunction to prevent Sandoz from entering the market before 
the issues could be resolved by the Court.275 The Northern District of 
California denied Amgen’s motion, ruling that the disclosure and notice 
provisions of the BPCIA were not mandatory.276 And, in a remarkably 
fractured decision, the Federal Circuit agreed.277 
The first question considered by the Court addressed the patent 
dance: 
Is an Applicant required by 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) to provide the 
Sponsor with a copy of its biologics license application and related 
manufacturing information, which the statute says the Applicant “shall 
provide,” and, where an Applicant fails to provide that required 
information, is the Sponsor’s sole recourse to commence a declaratory-
 271.  FDA accepts Sandoz application biosimilar filgrastim, SANDOZ: A NOVARTIS DIVISION, 
(July 24, 2014), https://www.sandoz.com/news/media-releases/fda-accepts-sandoz-application-
biosimilar-filgrastim [https://perma.cc/LM72-GVX4]. 
 272.  FDA accepts Sandoz application biosimilar filgrastim, SANDOZ: A NOVARTIS DIVISION, 
(July 24, 2014), https://www.sandoz.com/news/media-releases/fda-accepts-sandoz-application-
biosimilar-filgrastim [https://perma.cc/LM72-GVX4]. 
 273.  See Prescribing Information, NEUPOGEN (FILGRASTIM), 
https://www.neupogenhcp.com/important-safety-information/ [https://perma.cc/9LBB-2WLQ]; 
NEUPOGEN (FILGRASTIM), HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 2, 14, 
https://www.pi.amgen.com/~/media/amgen/repositorysites/pi-amgen-
com/neupogen/neupogen_pi_hcp_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV52-L5ZV]. 
274.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1676. 
275.  Id. at 1673. 
276.  Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 14–cv–04741–RS, 2015 WL 1264756, 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
19, 2015), aff’d in part and vacated in part by 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
277.  Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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judgment action under 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) and/or a patent-
infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii)?278 
The Federal Circuit Court essentially sidestepped the question of whether 
the statutory commandment that a biosimilar applicant “shall provide” 
indicates that the requirement is mandatory, and, instead, held that an RPS 
cannot seek enforcement of this section by injunction under federal law.279 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that the BPCIA 
provides the exclusive federal remedy for failure to disclose the required 
information by authorizing an RPS to bring an immediate declaratory-
judgment action:280 
If a subsection (k) applicant fails to provide the application and 
information required under paragraph (2)(A), the reference product 
sponsor, but not the subsection (k) applicant, may bring an action under 
section 2201 of Title 28, for a declaration of infringement, validity, or 
enforceability of any patent that claims the biological product or a use 
of the biological product.281 
The Supreme Court continued, however, by concluding that the 
Federal Circuit erred in relying on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) as precluding 
state law remedies.282 As the Supreme Court explained, failure to disclose 
the aBLA and related information is not part of the artificial act of 
infringement established in § 271(e)(2)(c):283 
It shall be an act of infringement to submit— 
(i) with respect to a patent that is identified in the list of patents 
described in section 351(l)(3) of the Public Health Service Act 
(including as provided under section 351(l)(7) of such Act), an 
application seeking approval of a biological product, or 
(ii) if the applicant for the application fails to provide the 
application and information required under section 351(l)(2)(A) of 
such Act, an application seeking approval of a biological product 
for a patent that could be identified pursuant to section 
351(l)(3)(A)(i) of such Act, 
if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act 
to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, 
278.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1674. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. 
281.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) (2017). 
282.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1674. 
283.  Id. 
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veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent 
or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such 
patent.284 
As the Court put it: “The flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is 
that Sandoz’s failure to disclose its application and manufacturing 
information was not an act of artificial infringement, and thus was not 
remediable under § 271(e)(4).”285 Instead, the artificial infringement is the 
act of submitting the application.286 The language in the statute regarding 
noncompliance with § 262(l)(2)(A) is not an element of infringement, but 
rather “merely assists in identifying which patents will be the subject of 
the artificial infringement suit.”287 As a result, the exclusive remedies 
outlined in § 271(e)(4) for this artificial infringement do not apply.288 
Instead, the Supreme Court remanded this issue back to the Federal 
Circuit to determine whether an injunction is available under state law to 
enforce § 262(l)(2)(A), or whether state law enforcement is preempted by 
BPCIA.289 If the Federal Circuit were to determine that state-law remedies 
are pre-empted (as it later did),290 biosimilar applicants would be able to 
continue withholding information required by the BPCIA without threat 
of enforcement of that provision.291 
The second question before the Court was whether a biosimilar 
applicant could give the 180-day Notice of Commercial Marketing prior 
to FDA approval, or whether such notice would not be effective until FDA 
approval (as the Federal Circuit held below).292 This question was related 
to interpretation of another part of the statute, 42 U.S.C § 262(l)(8)(A): 
“The subsection (k) applicant shall provide notice to the reference product 
sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the first commercial 
marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”293 
Sandoz had provided this notice prior to obtaining FDA approval, and the 
district court agreed with Sandoz that this notice was effective.294 
284.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(c) (2010). 
285.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1674. 
286.  Id. 
287.  Id. 
288.  Id. at 1675. 
289.  Id. at 1676. 
290.  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
291.  Id. The Federal Circuit later found that state law remedies were preempted by the BPCIA; 
see, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017) -- One Last Dance . . . (December 14, 2017)( 
https://www.patentdocs.org/2017/12/amgen-inc-v-sandoz-inc-fed-cir-2017-one-last-dance-.html) 
292.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 1677. 
293.  42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2017) (emphasis added). 
294.  Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 14–cv–04741–RS, 2015 WL 1264756, *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
19, 2015), aff’d in part and vacated in part by 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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Sandoz’s biosimilar, under the brand name Zarxio, obtained FDA 
approval on March 5, 2015, and under the district court’s interpretation of 
the statute Sandoz was free to enter the market (an outcome prevented by 
an injunction granted by the Federal Circuit pending its decision on 
appeal).295 The Federal Circuit had agreed with Amgen that notice could 
only effectively be given after the biosimilar product has been approved 
by the FDA.296 According to the Federal Circuit, while in other portions 
of the statute the biosimilar product is referred to as “the biological 
product that is the subject of the application,” in subsection (l)(8)(A) the 
statute reads “the biological product licensed under subsection (k).”297 
The change in language indicated to the Federal Circuit that “[i]f Congress 
intended paragraph (l)(8)(A) to permit effective notice before the product 
is licensed, it would have used the ‘subject of’ language.”298 The appellate 
court appreciated that Congress made this distinction at least in part 
because it is only after licensure that “the product, its therapeutic uses, 
and its manufacturing processes are fixed,” something that even the 
biosimilar applicant does not know with certainty when it applies for FDA 
approval.299 
In addition, “[g]iving notice after FDA licensure, once the scope of 
the approved license is known and the marketing of the proposed 
biosimilar product is imminent, allows the RPS to effectively determine 
whether, and on which patents, to seek a preliminary injunction from the 
court.”300 This permits “a fully crystallized controversy” between the 
parties to have arisen when suit is filed, and “provides a defined statutory 
window during which the court and the parties can fairly assess the 
parties’ rights prior to the launch of the biosimilar product.”301 
Interpreting the statute as advanced by Sandoz would, on the contrary, 
result in a situation where “the RPS would be left to guess the scope of 
the approved license and when commercial marketing would actually 
begin.”302 Sandoz presented this question to the Court in 
its certiorari petition: “Whether notice of commercial marketing given 
before FDA approval can be effective and whether, in any event, treating 
Section 262(l)(8)(A) as a stand-alone requirement and creating an 
295.  Id. 
296.  Amgen, Inc., 794 F.3d at 1358. 
297.  Id. at 1357. 
298.  Id. 
299.  Id. at 1358. 
300.  Id. 
301.  Id. 
302.  Id. 
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injunctive remedy that delays all biosimilars by 180 days after approval is 
improper.”303 
The Supreme Court reversed.304 The Court’s analysis regarding the 
180-day notice provisions of the statute was straightforward.305 The Court 
held that the Federal Circuit had misinterpreted the statutory language by 
imposing a requirement for FDA approval before proper notice could be 
given.306 According to the opinion, the reference in the statute to a 
licensed biosimilar product was to the term “commercial marketing” not 
“notice,” and thus just imposed the requirement that a product be licensed 
before it is marketed.307 With this interpretation the notice was not tied to 
a product having been licensed before notice was given, as the Federal 
Circuit had held, but to the unremarkable reality that the product had to 
be licensed before it was sold.308 The Supreme Court found only one 
timing requirement in the statute; that notice must be provided 180 days 
prior to marketing the biosimilar product.309 The opinion recognized the 
Federal Circuit opinion to contain a second timing requirement, that FDA 
had approved the biosimilar.310 This second requirement was not in the 
statute according to the Court and hence requiring approval was a 
misinterpretation of the statutory language by the Federal Circuit.311 This 
conclusion was supported for the Court by the structure of subsection 
§262(l)(8)(B).312 According to the opinion, Congress would have used
this structure in its language for §262(l)(8)(A) if it intended the provision 
to have the interpretation applied by the Federal Circuit.313 
Outside this question of statutory interpretation, the Court identified 
the policy arguments raised by the parties and the government and refused 
to be persuaded by the plausible contentions set forth therein.314 Rather, 
the Court recommended that Congress is the appropriate body for making 
303.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677. 
304.  Id. at 1678. 
305.  See id. at 1677. 
306.  Id. 
307.  Id. 
308.  Id. 
309.  Id. 
310.  Id. 
311.  Id.  
312.  Sandoz, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1677 (42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B) reads, in part, “[a]fter receiving 
the notice under subparagraph (A) and before such date of the first commercial marketing of such 
biological product, the reference product sponsor may seek a preliminary injunction. . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
313.  Id. 
314.  Id. at 1678. 
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these policy distinctions and advised the parties to go there to effect a 
change in the law.315 
Justice Breyer filed a brief concurring opinion, directed to his 
concerns (voiced during oral argument) that Congress had delegated 
responsibility to the FDA for interpreting the statute, based in part on its 
greater expertise.316 The Justice thus invited the agency to “depart from, 
or to modify, today’s interpretation” under the appropriate circumstance, 
citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet 
Services, to support his interpretation of the agency’s authority in this 
regard.317 
I. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus (2018) (Denial of Certiorari 
by Supreme Court) 
On October 1, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to 
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals in its appeal of the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus that affirmed the district court’s 
decision that the claims of Regeneron’s patent-in-suit were unenforceable 
due to inequitable conduct in the patent’s procurement.318 In so doing, the 
Court passed up the opportunity to consider whether the split panel’s 
decision was consistent with the Federal Circuit’s own inequitable 
conduct jurisprudence, most recently handed down en banc in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.319 The Court also passed 
up an opportunity to clarify, for the first time in over 70 years, a doctrine 
stemming directly from an ancient trio of its own decisions.320 Under the 
circumstances, it is prudent for patent practitioners (prosecutors as well as 
litigators) to consider the lessons of the Federal Circuit’s Regeneron 
decision. 
To recap, the case arose over Regeneron’s infringement suit against 
Merus involving U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018,321 which is directed to 
transgenic mice expressing human variable domain immunoglobulin (Ig) 
315.  Id. 
316.  Id. 
317.  Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet 
Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982–84 (2005)). 
 318.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 122 (2018). 
319.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 320.  See generally Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1944); 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945); Keystone Driller 
Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).  
321.  U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018 (filed June 20, 2011). 
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genes.322 Claim 1 is representative: “1. A genetically modified mouse, 
comprising in its germline human unrearranged variable region gene 
segments inserted at an endogenous mouse immunoglobulin locus.”323 
As explained in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the types of antibody 
molecules that can be produced in mice using modern immunological and 
molecular biological techniques ranges from completely murine to 
completely human, and also include chimeric antibodies (encoded by 
human constant region genes and mouse variable domain genes) and 
“reverse” chimeric antibodies (encoded by human variable region genes 
and mouse constant region genes).324 These possibilities are illustrated in 
the brief by a diagram (where green portions of the antibodies are encoded 
by mouse genes and yellow portions are encoded by human genes):325 
Relevant to the issues before the Court was construction of the proper 
scope and meaning of the term “comprising in its germline human 
unrearranged variable region gene segments.”326 Regeneron argued that 
this term was limited to inserting only human unrearranged variable 
regions genes, and thus only reverse chimeric antibodies would be 
encoded in the recombinant mouse genome; Regeneron argued its 
construction was supported by the plain meaning of the term and the ‘018 
patent specification.327 Merus, on the other hand, argued that the word 
“comprising” in the claim made the proper construction broader than just 
insertion of human unrearranged variable region gene segments, but also 
encompassed mice having genomes that encoded humanized, fully 
322.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1349. 
323.  Id. at 1348. 
324.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1348. 
325.  Id. 
326.  Id. at 1348–49. 
327.  Id. at 1352. 
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human, and reverse chimeric antibody embodiments.328 The district court 
adopted Merus’ construction, and the Federal Circuit agreed.329 
This leads to the first lesson from the case: with regard to the but-for 
materiality prong of the Therasense test, the issue arises whether the 
standard of claim construction used by the examiner—broadest 
reasonable interpretation or BRI—is sufficient to prevent the district court 
from applying its own claim construction, consistent with Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., to arrive at a different conclusion.330 Here, whether the withheld 
references were but-for material depended on whether the interpretation 
of the phrase “comprising [human variable chain immunoglobulin genes]” 
was at least as broad before the Patent Office as it was before the district 
court.331 (It is an unstated assumption that it should be, because the 
possibility that an applicant can amend the claims under the BRI test 
should make this the broadest construction.) If, as Regeneron contended, 
the claim language precluded embodiments wherein all or part of the 
human constant region genes were included, then the materiality of the 
undisclosed references may not have been as apparent to Regeneron or the 
examiner as it was to the district court and a majority of the Federal Circuit 
panel. This raises a serious issue of whether a district court must (or at 
least should) be bound by evidence of the context of prosecution to 
determine whether the examiner would have considered an uncited 
reference to satisfy the but-for materiality test (which reasonably should 
be the standard for whether an applicant or applicant’s counsel withheld 
material references during prosecution). Under the Federal Circuit’s 
Regeneron opinion the answer is no; this suggests that a patent prosecutor 
has two options for prudent practice: either make explicit (even if only by 
repeating any claim construction assertions made by the examiner) what 
the claims terms mean (contemporary practice avoids anything so 
potentially limiting) or expanding the scope of disclosure beyond either 
the applicant’s or the examiner’s understanding to preclude any 
interpretation from being broader that the one before the examiner. 
Turning to the references, it was undisputed that during prosecution 
of the ‘018 patent, four references were known to Regeneron and its 
counsel that were not cited to the Patent Office. These references are: 
1. Marianne Brüggemann & Michael S. Neuberger, “Strategies
for Expressing Human Antibody Repertoires in Transgenic
328.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1350. 
329.  Id. at 1352. 
330.  Id. at 1353. 
331.  Id.  
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Mice,” 17(8) Review Immunology Today 391 (1996) 
(Brüggemann);332 
2. Shinsuke Taki et al., “Targeted Insertion of a Variable Region
Gene into the Immunoglobulin Heavy Chain Locus,” 262
Science 1268 (1993) (Taki);333
3. Yong–Rui Zou et al, “Cre-lox P-mediated Gene Replacement:
A Mouse Strain Producing Humanized Antibodies,” 4(12)
Current Biology 1099 (1994) (Zou);334 and
4. WIPO Patent Publication No. WO 91/00906 entitled
“Chimeric and Transgenic Animals Capable of Producing
Human Antibodies,” credited to Clive Wood et al. (Wood).335
These references were cited by a third party during prosecution of a 
related application after Regeneron received a Notice of Allowance for 
the ‘018 patent.336 Regeneron did not submit these references to the Patent 
Office in the application that was granted as the ‘018 patent but did cite 
these references in all other pending related applications.337 
This leads to the second lesson: cite everything, particularly 
references that are genuinely unknown to anyone under a Rule 56 duty, 
and when that art becomes known before allowed patent claims are 
permitted to issue. Any such reference will need to be cited, as Regeneron 
did, in all further related applications, and compliance with the duty of 
candor in those cases can be used (as it was here) as evidence supporting 
the materiality of the references. (These actions can also be used to 
support an inference of an intent to deceive; the district court’s application 
of an adverse inference, infra, prevented its decision from being an issue 
on appeal.) 
The district court made the following findings of fact regarding the 
uncited references: 
• Brüggemann was a review article that suggested replacing
mouse Ig genes with human Ig genes in the mouse Ig locus.
This specific “swapping” of the mouse and human genes would 
be an improvement over random integration (this was an
argument Regeneron had made in support of its own
invention). Regeneron’s basis for distinguishing this reference
332.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1349. 
333.  Id.  
334.  Id. 
335.  Id. at 1350. 
336.  Id. at 1349. 
337.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1350. 
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was that it does not teach reverse chimeric antibodies, but the 
district court’s claim construction vitiated whatever force that 
argument may have had (or the significance of that argument 
on the materiality of the reference).338 
• The Wood reference (according to the district court) also
disclosed Ig locus targeting, based on expert testimony. The
materiality of this reference was also based on its teaching that
the constant region can be exogenous or endogenous, and thus
encompasses insertion into the mouse Ig locus.339
• The Taki reference disclosed insertion of variable region genes
from one mouse into another mouse, but the district court found 
the relevant consideration to be targeting exogenous Ig genes
into an endogenous mouse Ig locus, not the mouse-human
distinction. However, neither the district court nor the Federal
Circuit addressed the distinction with the ‘018 patent claims
that Taki discloses introduction of rearranged variable region
genes and the ‘018 patent claims introduction of unrearranged
human variable region genes.340
• The Zou reference disclosed modifying mouse constant region
not variable region genes; but here again, the district court
found the salient disclosure was targeting exogenous Ig genes
into the mouse Ig locus.341
Although neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit found these 
references, alone or in combination, satisfied the requirements in the 
statute for invalidating the ‘018 patent claims (a fact noted in Judge 
Newman’s dissent), the district court found that these references were but-
for material, and this satisfied the first prong of the Therasense test for 
finding inequitable conduct.342 
The district court also found that these references were not 
cumulative over the cited prior art, in particular U.S. Patent No. 6,114,598 
to Kucherlapati, and a reference to Lonberg that had been overcome 
during prosecution of the ‘018 patent.343 Regeneron argued that the 
Brüggemann reference was cumulative over Kucherlapati; the Wood 
reference was cumulative over Lonberg; and the Taki reference was 
338.  Id. at 1353. 
339.  Id. 
340.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1354. 
341.  Id. 
342.  Id. at 1356. 
343.  Id. at 1355. 
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cumulative over the combination of Kucherlapati and Lonberg.344 
Specifically, Regeneron argued that Kucherlapati taught substitution of an 
exogenous (xenogeneic) locus at an endogenous target locus in the mouse 
genome, and that Lonberg taught a “knockout plus transgene” model, 
where the human antibody-encoding sequences are randomly inserted and 
the endogenous mouse Ig genes are disabled.345 The district court 
distinguished the Kucherlapati reference from the Brüggemann reference 
by finding that Kucherlapati taught wholesale replacement of exogenous 
immunoglobulin (Ig) genes for the endogenous mouse Ig locus, and that 
such a replacement included mouse regulatory sequences whose removal 
could interfere with normal B-cell development and antibody 
production.346 With regard to the Lonberg reference, the district court 
found that the Wood reference taught targeted insertion (as recited in the 
‘018 patent claims) while Lonberg taught insertion at random sites in the 
mouse genome.347 And the district court found that the combination of 
Kucherlapati and Lonberg was not cumulative to the Taki reference 
because Taki taught targeted insertion, and neither Kucherlapati nor 
Lonberg have these teachings.348 
This is the third lesson: it can be challenging to apprehend the 
decisions a district court judge may make regarding whether uncited 
references are cumulative. A defendant’s expert will likely be the vehicle 
for introducing such evidence, which is directed to questions of fact, and 
the district court will be entitled to deference regarding not only the 
ultimate decision but also the credibility of contending expert witnesses. 
Thus, the prudent course is to consider all references not to be cumulative 
unless they are different versions of the same reference (e.g., a PCT/WIPO 
published application and its counterpart EPO publication of the same 
application). 
With regard to the second prong of the Therasense test, intent to 
deceive, the Federal Circuit upheld (and the Supreme Court will not 
disturb) the district court’s drawing of an adverse inference based on the 
litigation misconduct catalogued by the district court in its opinion as not 
being an abuse of discretion.349 The panel majority’s decision was 
supported by Regeneron’s failure to “meaningfully dispute any of the 
344.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1355. 
345.  Id.  
346.  Id. at 1356. 
347.  Id. 
348.  Id.  
349.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1356. 
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factual findings underlying the district court’s decision,”350 which 
included improperly withholding and citing on privilege logs documents 
clearly not privileged (such as experimental data); withholding as 
privileged information where the privilege had been waived; and 
withholding evidence of patent prosecution counsels’ reasoning and state 
of mind relevant to whether counsel had an intent to deceive.351 The latter 
included, inter alia, the following cited in the Court’s opinion: 
• I firmly believed—and still believe today—that Brüggemann,
Taki, Zou and Wood were not material to patentability because
they were substantially different from the mice claimed in the
‘176 application . . . and were cumulative of other information
before the Patent Examiner.352
• [Counsel’s] description of his understanding of what a
materiality analysis for inequitable conduct involves:
“Regardless of whether I satisfied the minimum requirements
of being an ordinary skilled artisan, I felt comfortable
evaluating the art from that perspective during the prosecution
of the ‘176 application. When I did have questions, however, I
did not hesitate to reach out to those with more experience and
knowledge.353
• I routinely made Regeneron inventors aware of the foregoing
obligations when providing them with invention
declarations.354
• With regard to Brüggemann and Zou, “I was generally familiar 
with the subject matter of those two references . . . [a]t no time
did I consider these references to be material to patentability to
the claims pending in the ‘176.”355
• Because of this experience [prosecuting the ‘176 application as
well as the ‘287 Patent], I was readily familiar with both prior
art that was before the Examiner in the ‘176 application and the
pending claims of the ‘176 application.356
350.  Id. 
351.  Id. at 1362. 
352.  Id. at 1360 (alteration in original). 
353.  Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1360 (alteration in original). 
354.  Id. 
355.  Id.  
356.  Id. at 1360–61 
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• I viewed the analysis [relating to the Withheld References] as
straightforward.”357“I concluded that [the Withheld
References], alone or combined with other prior art of which I
was aware, were cumulative of information already before the
Examiner. Furthermore, it was my view that the skilled artisan
would not have viewed them as teaching the reverse chimeric
inventions that the Examiner had allowed in the ‘176
application.358
The tragedy for the patent prosecutors in this case is that this 
evidence not considered by the district court is the kind of evidence those 
prosecutors believed they would be able to present at trial, and that the 
contemporaneous record provided powerfully-exculpatory evidence 
regarding their subjective intent at the time they made the decision not to 
submit the references. Thus, the fourth lesson is: a patent prosecutor 
cannot have any reasonable basis for believing that they will have an 
absolute right, protected by due process, to present the evidence of their 
actual intent as a defense to an inequitable conduct charge. The extent to 
which the purported litigation misconduct deserved the sanction of an 
adverse inference is not the issue; what is important it that whether a 
patent prosecutor is exposed to an inequitable conduct determination can 
be, under the precedent established in this case, totally devoid of any 
deceptive intent on their part, no matter what evidence the prosecutor may 
have that would excuse a failure to disclose material prior art. 
The Supreme Court’s decision not to review this case leaves a split 
between this decision and a pre-Therasense case, Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn 
Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cited by Judge 
Newman in her dissent.359 In that case, according to Judge Newman, “we 
held that courts may not punish a party’s post-prosecution misconduct by 
declaring the patent unenforceable” and cited multiple cases applying the 
principle that litigation misconduct can bar a litigant but does not render 
a patent unenforceable.360 Yet that is what happened here, and thus any 
comfort Therasense may have given the patent bar regarding the need for 
evidence, inferential or otherwise, of a patent prosecutor’s intent to 
deceive, is greatly diminished by this decision. 
Finally, because intent to deceive is personal (insofar as it applies 
only to those individuals who have a Rule 56 duty to disclose), it seems 
357.  Id. at 1361. 
358.  Id.  
359.  See Regeneron Pharms., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1365–74 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
360.  Id. at 1366 (citing Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), 
overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976)). 
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inequitable to draw such an inference against the attorneys who 
prosecuted the ‘018 patent based on the conduct (bad or just 
misunderstood) of litigation counsel who did not have a Rule 56 duty of 
candor and were not involved in prosecuting the ‘018 patent to allowance. 
Inequitable conduct based on a practitioner’s intent to deceive is a serious 
allegation having deleterious consequences to a patent prosecutor’s 
reputation and can also have as negative repercussions an ethics inquiry 
by the Patent Office’s disciplinary officials. Accordingly, it is not 
unreasonable for patent prosecutors to be placed in such jeopardy solely 
due to their own mis- or mal-feasance, rather than to be at the whim of 
conduct by litigation counsel taken for strategic reasons at trial (as the 
district court’s decision and Federal Circuit opinion alleged here) that are 
found to be subject to sanction. The decision also perhaps raises questions 
of whether improperly rendering a patent unenforceable for inequitable 
conduct by a misapplication of the Therasense standard may amount to a 
14th Amendment violation for taking property rights without due process. 
These issues were not enough for the Court to consider them worthy of its 
review, and thus remain somewhat uncertain. 
J.  Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp. (2017) (Decision by Justice 
Sotomayor, joined by Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, 
Kennedy, Thomas; Concurrence by Justice Alito) 
The Supreme Court in this case decided whether the supply of a 
single component of a multi-component invention for combination abroad 
violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).361 
The patent-in-suit, known as the Tautz patent and exclusively 
licensed by Promega Corporation, claims a toolkit for genetic testing by 
DNA amplification.362 There are five components to the patent: “(1) a 
mixture of primers that mark the part of the DNA strand to be copied; (2) 
nucleotides for forming replicated strands of DNA; (3) an enzyme known 
as Taq polymerase; (4) a buffer solution for the amplification; and (5) 
control DNA.”363 The patent was sublicensed to Life Technologies by 
Promega to manufacture and sell the toolkits worldwide.364 Life 
Technologies manufactured all components except the Taq polymerase in 
the United Kingdom; the polymerase was manufactured in the United 
361.  Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 739 (2017).  
362.  Id. at 738. 
363.  Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 738. 
364.  Id. 
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States.365 The polymerase was then shipped to the U.K. to be combined 
with the other four components.366 Promega sued Life Technologies 
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), which prohibits supply of all or a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention for 
combination abroad.367 The jury in the district court found that Life 
Technologies willfully infringed the patent, and the district court granted 
Life Technologies motion for judgment as a matter of law.368 The court 
agreed with Life Technologies that “all or a substantial portion” of an 
invention does not encompass the supply of a single component.369 The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that 
“substantial” means “important”, and the Taq polymerase is an essential 
component for the invention.370 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
question was “whether the supply of a single component of a 
multicomponent invention is an infringing act under U.S.C. § 
271(f)(1).”371 
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the use of the 
term “substantial” refers to a qualitative or quantitative measurement.372 
The statute does not provide a definition for the term, and the plain 
meaning of the term is ambiguous without context.373 The Court construed 
the statute to mean that in context the phrase “all or a substantial portion” 
points toward a quantitative meaning.374 “Portion” and “all” have 
quantitative meanings, and the Court provided several dictionary 
definitions for these terms.375 Additionally, the fact that the phrase 
“substantial portion” is modified by “of the components of a patented 
invention” supported a quantitative interpretation in the Court’s view.376 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the text of the statute is correctly 
interpreted quantitatively.377 The Court declined to adopt an interpretation 
that would require both quantitative and qualitative analyses.378 A 
qualitative analysis would require determining which components of the 
365.  Id. 
366.  Id. 
367.  Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2010). 
368.  Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 739. 
369.  Id. 
370.  Id. 
371.  Id. 
372.  Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 739. 
373.  Id. 
374.  Id. at 740. 
375.  Id. 
376.  See id. 
377.  Id. 
378.  Id.  
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invention are more important than the others.379 This complicates the duty 
of the factfinder due to its subjectivity, and is not supported by the text of 
the statute.380 
Next, the Court determined “whether, as a matter of law, a single 
component can ever constitute a ‘substantial portion’ so as to trigger 
liability under §271(f)(1).”381 The text of the statute consistently uses the 
term “components” in the plural when discussing the supply of a 
substantial number of components.382 The Court compared the section to 
§271(f)(2), which refers to “any component” in the singular.383 The
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the two provisions encompass different 
scenarios, and the Supreme Court agreed.384 However, the Supreme Court 
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that §271(f)(1) covers any 
single component.385 The Supreme Court concluded that “component” is 
meant to reference a single component and “components” is meant to 
reference many components.386 Due to this reading, the Court held that 
“all or a substantial portion” of a multicomponent invention cannot be a 
single component.387 The Court did not attempt to define how many 
components in a multicomponent invention would count as “all or a 
substantial portion.”388 
Based on this construction of the statutory language, the Supreme 
Court reversed the ruling of the Federal Circuit and remanded for further 
proceedings.389 The immediate consequence of this decision is likely to 
be an increase in otherwise infringing activities abroad, wherein staple 
components are produced outside the U.S. and more complex or 
sophisticated components are made at home, thereby disadvantaging 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical patentees who manufacture or assemble 
their products in the U.S. in favor of competitors who do so overseas. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
Several implications for patent law doctrine, as applied to 
biotechnology, emerge from the top ten judicial decisions surveyed above. 
379.  Id. at 741. 
380.  Id. 
381.  Id. 
382.  Life Techs. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 741. 
383.  Id. at 741–42. 
384.  Id. at 742. 
385.  Id. 
386.  Id. 
387.  Id. at 743. 
388.  Id.  
389.  Id.  
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Although only the passage of time and application by the courts will 
reveal the full topography of these implications, several lessons may 
already be drawn. 
A. Obviousness 
The Acorda decision suggests that the Federal Circuit is likely to 
continue a fairly broad interpretation of nonobviousness doctrine. This 
includes allowing challengers of patent validity to infer a generous 
amount of information from prior art references, and to combine such 
information relatively easily in order to made successful showings of 
nonobviousness. In particular, the existing of a blocking patent seems 
likely to make reliance on secondary indications of nonobviousness more 
difficult, leading to more invalidity findings. 
B. Statutory Subject Matter 
The Berkheimer decision appears to herald a change in direction for 
§101 subject matter doctrine. Here, the court suggested that a patentee or
patent applicant may have an heretofore unavailable opportunity to rebut 
findings of invalidity due to unpatentable subject matter. Under 
Berkheimer, facts matter in a § 101 analysis and disputed facts can may 
make it more difficult to invalidate patents on the pleadings, as well as at 
the summary judgment stage. 
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Patent Shield 
The issue of whether Native American tribes may use their tribal 
sovereign immunity to prevent challenges to their patents’ validity may 
ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court. In the meantime, however, 
the Federal Circuit has ruled that tribal sovereign immunity may not shield 
tribe-owned patents from invalidity proceedings like IPRs, and the 
Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in the first case squarely 
to present it with this issue. 
D. DNA Interference 
Whoever ultimately owns patents successfully claiming the 
application of the CRISPR/Cas9 (and other forms of Cas) in mammals is 
likely to benefit from a windfall on the order of magnitude of the PCR 
patent estate in the 1980s. Thus far, it appears that the Broad Institute (and 
co-assignees), and its now-famous biologist, Feng Zhang, will control 
fundamental patents claiming uses of CRISPR/Cas9 in mammals and 
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other eukaryotes, and will be big players in the gene editing stakes 
alongside the University of California/Berkeley (and co-assignees) and its 
own celebrity biologist, Jennifer Doudna. 
E. Continued viability of the PTAB and IPR 
The Supreme Court, in Oil States, decided that the Constitution does 
not prohibit the Patent Office from resolving issues of validity post 
issuance outside of an Article III Court. Whether one sees the PTAB as a 
patent death court or a judicious and efficient gatekeeper of patent quality, 
it now appears that IPRs are here to stay, at least in the medium term. They 
are likely to continue to play an outsized role in testing and invalidating 
biotechnology patents. 
F. Scope of PTAB Institutions and Written Decisions 
In light of the resilience of IPRs, the Supreme Court, in SAS Institute, 
also decided that the PTAB would have to provide written reasons for the 
decisions they make. This burden will add to the workload of 
administrative patent judges, but should also help to clarify the procedures 
and arguments the PTAB use in this innovative, relatively inexpensive, 
and quite rapid proceeding. 
G. Written Description of Antibodies 
In Amgen, the Federal Circuit harmonized the application of the 
written description requirement as applied to antibody claims with the 
manner in which it is applied to other biotechnological inventions, such 
as nucleotide sequences. This seems to bring antibody inventions into the 
fold of the generally stricter written description requirement that has been 
applied to biotechnology inventions for several decades. 
H. BPCIA implementation 
The Supreme Court’s put its imprimatur on Sandoz’s interpretation 
of the BPCIA not to require a biosimilars applicant to submit to the 
reference product sponsor its application and any manufacturing 
information, despite the usually mandatory “shall” in the express language 
of the statute (42 U.S.C. §262(k)(2)). This decision has disrupted patent 
litigation under the Act to an extent that only Congress can repair. 
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I. The Inequitable Road to Inequitable Conduct 
The Regeneron denial of certiorari provides a warning to those 
involved in prosecuting patents to be extremely careful in how they act 
and what prior art reference they cite to the examiner. Inequitable conduct 
in the antibody context appears to be relatively easy to demonstrate. For 
example, patent attorneys would be advised to err on the side of 
submitting more prior art, rather than less, in order to maximize the 
probability that a court will not find that any prior art references had been 
impermissibly withheld from the Patent Office. Abundance of 
prosecutorial caution may increase the volume of prior art examiners need 
to consider, with potential consequences for prosecution timing and Patent 
Office backlogs. 
J. Infringement Via Component Sales 
The Supreme Court used the Life Techs decision to interpret the 
meaning of a “substantial portion” of a claimed invention. It clarified that 
the approach should rely on quantitative, not qualitative, interpretation to 
determine whether or not patent infringement has occurred. The result is 
an inquiry into whether that number constitutes a substantial portion of a 
claimed invention. The Supreme Court held that a single component, as a 
matter of law, cannot constitute a “substantial portion” of a 
multicomponent invention. Overseas biotechnology manufacturing and 
assembly of products is likely to benefit. 
K. Issues on the Horizon 
Biotechnology shows no signs of slowing down. Quite to the 
contrary, the pace of innovation in the field, encompassing myriad new 
approaches to therapeutics, diagnostics, and even human enhancement, 
appears to be accelerating, diversifying, and increasingly affecting people 
as part of their ordinary lives. Biotechnology patent law will have to try 
to keep pace, with many significant judicial decisions expected in the 
future. It seems likely that biotechnology and the law of biotechnological 
patents will continue to provoke robust interest and heated controversy. 
However, discussion of these developments will have to await the 
“BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT LAW 2019 REVIEW.” 
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